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Of all scientific investigations into reasoning with uncertainty and chance, 
probability theory is perhaps the best understood paradigm. Nevertheless, all 
studies conducted thus far into the semantics of quantitative logic programming 
have restricted themselves to non-probabilistic semantic characterizations. In this 
paper, we take a few steps towards rectifying this situation. We define a logic 
programming language that is syntactically similar to the annotated logics of 
Blair and Subrahmanian (Theoret. Compur. Sci. 68 (1987), 35-54; J. Non-Classical 
Logic 5 (1988), 45-73) but in which the truth values are interpreted probabilisti- 
tally. A probabilistic model theory and lixpoint theory is developed for such 
programs. This probabilistic model theory satisfies the requirements proposed by 
Fenstad (in “Studies in Inductive Logic and Probabilities” (R. C. Jeffrey, Ed.), 
Vol. 2, pp. 251-262, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1980) for a function to be 
called probabilistic. The logical treatment of probabilities is complicated by two 
facts: first, that the connectives cannot be interpreted truth-functionally when truth 
values are regarded as probabilities; second, that negation-free definite-clause-like 
sentences can be inconsistent when interpreted probabilistically. We address these 
issues here and propose a formalism for probabilistic reasoning in logic program- 
ming. To our knowledge, this is the tirst probabilistic characterization of logic 
programming semantics. Ii 1 1992 Academic Press. Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Probabilities play a central role in our understanding of the world, and 
in the way in which we reason about the world. For instance, it is not 
uncommon to hear, from the Department of Health, that 94% of all people 
who test positive on the only existing test (called HIV) for AIDS actually 
have AIDS. 
Suppose now that an insurance company is considering an application 
from John Doe for health insurance. John Doe had a positive HIV test. 
Thus, there is a 6% chance that John Doe does not have AIDS. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the insurance company will insure John 
Doe. 
This scenario has been described to demonstrate that reasoning about 
probabilistic and statistical information is common in many real life 
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situations (for numerous examples on the applications of probability 
theory to human reasoning, see Gnedenko and Khinchin, 1962). Often, 
such probabilistic information is used in decisions made automatically 
(without human intervention) by computer programs. Thus, automated 
reasoning systems need to know how to reason with probabilistic 
information. 
Despite the fact that quantitative logic programming has been studied 
intensely (cf. the works of van Emden, 1986; Shapiro, 1983; Fitting, 
1988a, b; Blair and Subrahmanian, 1987, 1988; Kifer and Li, 1988; Kifer 
and Subrahmanian, 1992; and Morishita, 1989), no probabilistic founda- 
tion for multivalued logic programming has been developed thus far. There 
is no doubt that probability theory is the most widely accepted formalism 
for reasoning about chance and uncertainty. As logic programs are a 
natural formalism for designing rule based expert systems, it is of vital 
importance that they have the ability to reason with probabilistic 
information. The main aim of this paper is to propose and semantically 
characterize such a logic programming language. 
In brief, the principal contributions of this paper are: 
1. To design a logical framework within which probabilistic informa- 
tion can be easily expressed. This is done by extending the annotated logics 
introduced by Blair and Subrahmanian (1987) and Subrahmanian 
(1987, 1992) (i) to allow conjunctions and disjunctions to be annotated and 
(ii) to allow annotations to be closed intervals of truth values. 
2. To study the semantics of this language, and to clearly understand 
the relationships between probability theory, model theory, lixpoint theory, 
and proof theory for such languages. 
3. In particular, to show that the model-theoretic framework 
developed here satisfies the criteria proposed by Fenstad (1980) for a 
function to be called probabilistic. 
4. Some complications that arise in (2) above are that even sets of 
definite-clause-like formulas may be inconsistent in a probabilistic sense. 
For instance, the probabilistic statement “The probability of event E lies in 
the range [0.2, 0.33” is inconsistent with the probabilistic statement “The 
probability of E lies in the range [OS, 0.61.” Our model theory 
appropriately handles such probabilistic phenomena. 
5. To develop a query processing procedure for handling queries to 
such programs. The procedure is complicated by the fact that unification of 
conjunctions and disjunctions of atoms does not proceed in the classical 
way, and that mgu’s may not be unique. 
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2. SYNTAX 
Let L be a fixed first order language containing infinitely many variable 
symbols, and finitely many constant and predicate symbols, but no 
function symbols,’ and let B, be the Herbrand base of L. Thus, B, is 
always finite. 
DEFINITION 1. (i) conj(B1)= {A, A ... A A, 1 n>l is an integer, 
A i ,..., A,,EB~, and V1<i,j<n,i#j=+Ai#Ai}. 
(ii) di.sj(B,)= {A, v ... v A,) n>l is an integer, A, ,..., A,,EB~, 
and Vldi,jdn,i#j=~A,#A~). 
Thus, conj(B,) and disj( BL) denote, respectively, the sets of all ground 
conjunctions and disjunctions formed by using distinct atoms in B,. 
A conjunction or disjunction with repeated atoms is considered equivalent 
to one without repeated atoms, by simply deleting the repetitions. 
DEFINITION 2. If A is an atom (not necessarily ground) and p = 
[cc, p] G [0, 11, then A : p is called a p-annotated atom. p is called the 
p-annotation of A.’ Similarly, if C is a conjunction and D is a disjunction 
(both of which are not necessarily ground), then C : ,U and D : p are called 
a p-annotated conjunction and a p-annotated disjunction respectively. 
DEFINITION 3. A basic formula (not necessarily ground) is either a 
conjunction or a disjunction of atoms. Note that both disjunction and 
conjunction cannot occur simultaneously in one basic formula. Further- 
more, let bf(B,) denote the set of all ground basic formulas using distinct 
atoms in B,; i.e., bf(B,) = conj(B1) u di.sj(B,). 
DEFINITION 4. If A is an atom, F,, . . . . F, are basic formulas, and 
p, p,, . . . . pn are p-annotations, then A : p +- F, : pi A ... A F, : pL, is called 
a p-clause. A : p is called the head of this p-clause, while F, : p, A ... A 
F,, : p,, is called the body. We assume, usually, that p, p,, . . . . pL, are all 
distinct from [0, 11. 
Intuitively, if p = [or, p], then F : p is to read as: “The probability of F 
lies in the interval [a, PI”. Thus, to say that event F cannot occur, we 
’ The technical reason that function symbols are not supported will be clarified later. 
’ Note that here atoms are annotated with sets of truth values rather than with truth values 
as in Blair and Subrahmanian (1987). While sets of truth values may be used to annotate 
atoms, the resulting semantics prescribed by Blair and Subrahmanian (1987) is non- 
probabilistic. 
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merely say F : [0, 0] which is read as: “the probability of Flies in the inter- 
val [0, 01” which is the same as saying “the probability of event F is zero.” 
DEFINITION 5. A probabilistic logic program (p-program for short) is a 
finite set of p-clauses. 
We say that A : p is unifiable with B : $ via 8 iff A and B are unifiable 
via some substitution 0. Note that we are not defining the result of the 
unification yet. Also note that p-programs are different from the annotated 
programs of Blair and Subrahmanian (1987) in two ways: first, conjunc- 
tions and disjunctions are allowed to be annotated, and second, the 
annotations are sets of truth values rather than individual truth values. 
Both these distinctions have a significant impact on the semantics of 
annotated logics. Further distinctions from Blair and Subrahmanian (1987) 
are discussed in Examples 6 and 14. Note that p-programs are implicitly 
allowed to contain negation in clause heads because A : [0, 01, intuitively 
corresponds to the classical logic sentence “A is false.” Semantics of 
logic programs with negations in clause heads were studied first by 
Subrahmanian (1987) and later by Blair and Subrahmanian (1987). 
EXAMPLE 1. A long distance phone company, on receiving customers 
requests for connections, tries to find reliable paths within a network of 
relay centers. (Here assume that reliability is defined as the probability that 
a connection is error-free throughout the connected period.) The company 
supports two types of direct connection between relay centers. Suppose a 
statistical survey reveals the following performance figures for these two 
types of connections: 
(i) Type A connection on its own has a reliability of 90 % f 5 %. 
(ii) Type B connection, on the other hand, is more reliable, 
providing a reliability of over 90% on its own. 
(iii) Suppose X, Y, and Z are three centers. X and Z are connected 
by a Type A connection, while Z and Y are connected by a path of 
reliability at least 85%. Then the resulting path from X to Y suffers a drop 
in reliability to the 80 % to 95 % range. 
(iv) As part of a path, type B again is more reliable. If X and Z are 
connected by a type B connection and Z and Y are connected by a path 
of reliability at least 75%, then the resulting path from X to Y has a 
reliability of at least 85%. 
Now the company can use the following p-program to find the reliability 
of paths from one center to another (clauses l-4 correspond to points (i) 
to (iv), respectively): 
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path(X, Y) : [O.SS, 0.951 t a(X, Y) : [l, l] 
path(X, Y): [0.9, l] +h(X, Y): [l, l] 
path(X, Y) : [0.8,0.95] c u(X, Z) : [l, l] A puth(Z, Y) : CO.85, l] 
puth(X, Y) : CO.85, l] t b(X, Z) : [l, l] A puth(Z, Y) : CO.75, 11. 
3. FIXPOINT SEMANTICS 
DEFINITION 6. An atomic function is a mapping f: B, -+ %[O, 11, where 
%?[O, l] denotes the set of all closed sub-intervals of the unit interval 
co, 11. 
Note that the empty interval, denoted by @, is a closed interval of the 
form [cc, /I] with /I < CC. Intuitively an atomic function assigns a probability 
range to each ground atom. In the situation when the empty interval @ is 
assigned to an atomic function, inconsistency seems to exist. We formalize 
the notion of probabilistic consistency in the next section. 
Recall that p-programs allow non-atomic basic formulas to appear in the 
body but not in the head of p-clauses. Thus we need a mechanism to assign 
probability ranges to non-atomic formulas. Suppose P(E) is used to denote 
the probability of event E. Kolmogorov (1956) and Hailperin (1984) have 
shown that given distinct events E, and E,, we cannot precisely specify 
P(E, A E2) from P(E,) and P(E,). But we can characterize precisely the 
range within which the probability of (E, A E2) must lie. As Frechet (1935) 
has shown, max{O,P(E,)+P(E,)-l)<P(E, A E2)<min{P(E,),P(E,)} 
represents the tightest bounds for P(E, A E,). This result can be 
generalized as shown below. In the sequel, a world is simply a Herbrand 
interpretation as defined in Lloyd (1987). Given the two events, there are 
four possible worlds: first, world K,, in which the events E, and E, both 
occur; second, world K2, in which E, occurs, but E, does not occur; third, 
world K,, in which E, occurs while E, does not occur; and last, world K4, 
in which neither E, nor E, occur. Suppose P( E, ) E [ai, j, ] s [0, 1 ] and 
P(E,) E [cr,, /I21 c [0, 11. Furthermore, let kj be the probability that world 
Ki is the actual world. This situation can be expressed via the following 
linear program Q: 
i k,= 1, 
j= 1 
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and 
for j= 1, . . . . 4, kj>O. 
As event E, occurs in worlds K, and K, which are mutually incompatible 
worlds, the probability of E, occurring is (k, + k,). As WE,) is known to 
be in [cI,, /I,], this gives rise to the first inequality in the linear program 
Q. The second inequality arises similarly when we consider E, instead of 
E,. The third inequality says that the four possible worlds encompass all 
possibilities. The fourth inequality simply asserts that probabilities are 
non-negative. 
To find the range for P(E, A E,), we need to solve the linear program 
Q for the parameter k, that represents the probability of the world in 
which E, and E, are both true. However, in general, there is no unique 
solution. Thus, we need to solve Q to find the minimal and maximal values 
of k,. Likewise, to find the range for P(E, v E2), we solve for the minimal 
and maximal values of (k, + k, + k3). Hereafter we use the notation mine E 
and maxo E to denote the minimization and maximization of expression E 
subject to the linear program Q described above. 
THEOREM 1. For the linear program Q, 
and 
for j= 1, . . . . 4, kj >, 0, 
(i) minok,=mas{O,a,+cr,-l}, 
(ii) maxQ k, =min(j3,, fi2} 
(iii) mino(k,+kz+k,)=max{a,,a,), and 
(iv) maxQ (k, +k2+k3)=min(1, b, +/j2). 
Proqf: (i) Claim. minQ k, = max{O, cx, + a, - 1). 
Case 1. a,+cc,<l. First observe that k,=O, kz=a,, k3=q, 
k, = (1 - c1r - CI?) is a solution to the linear program. Second, any solution 
to the linear program satisfies the constraint k, 30. Therefore, it follows 
that minok,=O=ma.x(0,cr,+c12-1). 
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Case 2. c(r + a2 > 1. First observe that k, = (a, + CI>- l), k2 = 
(1 - c1?), k, = ( 1 - a,), k, = 0 is a solution to the linear program. Suppose 
there exists a solution such that k, < (c(, + c/~ - 1). That is, k, = 
(a, + d2 - 1 - 6), for some 6 > 0. Then to satisfy the first inequality, 
k2 2 (1 -LX? + 6). Similarly to satisfy the second inequality, k, 3 
(I- @1 + 6). Therefore, it follows that (k, + kz + k3) > (~1, + cz, - 1 - 6) + 
(1-cc,+6)+(1-ol,+6)=(1+S)>1. Thus, k,<O, which is a contradic- 
tion! Therefore, for all solutions to the linear program, k, 2 (ct, + z2 - 1). 
Thus it follows that mine k, = ((x, + cc2 - 1) = max{O, a, + a, - 11. Com- 
bining the results for Case 1 and 2, claim (i) is proved. 
(ii) Claim. maxQ k, = min{ /?, , aI}. 
Case 1. /I,</&. First observe that k,=/?,, k,=O, k3=(&-PI), 
k, = (1 - B2) is a solution to the linear program. Second, for all solutions 
to the linear program and in particular to the first inequality, k, < /I,, since 
kz>O. Therefore, max~k,=B,=min(B,,B2). 
Case 2. j1>p2. The proof that maxok,=~2=min{fl,,/12) is 
similar to the above. Combining the results for Case 1 and 2, claim (ii) is 
proved. 
(iii) C/aim. minQ (k, + k, + k3) = max{ x1, x2 >. We subtract the first 
two inequalities of Q from 1 to have the following inequalities: 
l-a,>l-k,-k2=k4+k3>1-j,, 
1 -q>/ 1 -k,-k3=k4+kl>1 -/J,. 
It is then easy to see that k, plays the role of k, in Q. Hence, it follows 
from (ii) that maxQ k, = min{ 1 - CI,, 1 - z2 1. Thus, it is easy to check that, 
mino(k,+k,+k,)=l-maxok4=mu.Y{a,,a2). 
(iv) Claim. maxo(k,+k2+k3)=minfl,fi,+/?2). The proof is 
similar to that of case (iii). This completes the proof of the theorem. 1 
We define two operators @ and @ that combine intervals according to 
Theorem 1. 
DEFINITION 7. Let [cr,, /3,] and [cx,, p2] be sub-intervals of [0, 11. 
Define: 
(1) theoperator @,where [orl,B1]O[ccz,Br]=[max(0,a,+~2-l}), 
min{B1, 82}1, and 
(2) the operator 0, where [a,, Br] 0 [a,, Bz] = [max{ol,, %>, 
minfl, PI +B2}1. 
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The following lemma shows a few properties of @ and @ that will be used 
in later proofs. 
LEMMA 1. Let [cr,, p,], [q, BJ, [a,, P31, CS,, ~~1, and C&, ~21 allhe 
sub-interoals of [0, 11. 
(1) @ and @ are commutative; e.g., [cc,, PI J @ [az, PI] = [CC?, bz] @ 
II@,, fill. 
(2) @ and 0 are associative, e.g., ([cc,, PI] 0 [a?. /?,I)0 [a,, /I31 = 
C~,,B,lo(Ccrz,PzlOCcc~,B~l). 
(3) 0 and @ are monotonic on both arguments, e.g., if [cr,. PI] 2 
Cd,, Y,], and Ccc,, B21 2 Cb, ~~1, then Cg,, PII 0 C~Z, Al 2 CS,, ?/II@ 
[S2, YJ 
(4) @ and @ are strictly monotonic on both arguments; e.g., replace 
the relation 2 in case 3 abooe with 3. 
(5) 0oCa,,B,l=0 andIZIOCa,,8,1=0. 
(6) C~,~B,l~~~,~l=C~,,~1~~~C~,~P,10C~~~1=C~.B~1~ 
Proof: (1) and (6) follow immediately from Definition 7. As for proofs 
of (2), (3), and (5), we only show the case for 0, as those for 0 are 
similar. The proof of (4) is a straightforward modification of the one for 
(3). 
(i) Claim. ~C~~,~~10C~z,Pzl~OC~~~831=C~I~8110~C~~~P~10 
[a,, b3]). By Definition 7, [aI, PI] 0 [Q, pz] = [max(O, ccl + CX~ - 1 }, 
min{/?,, B2)]. Then again by the same definition, ([a,, p,] 0 [cc,, B2])@ 
Ca,,BJ= Cmax{0,max{0,~l+~2-1}+~~-1}, min(fi3,min{BI,P3)}1. 
Sincecc,dl,max{0,max(0,a,+cc2-1}+cr,-1)=max{0,cr,+a2+cr,-2}. 
In addition, min{fij,min{P,, a,}} =min{/?,, B2, uj}. Therefore, ([GI,, /I,] 
C3[~2,P21)OC~3,831 = Cmax{0,~l+~2+~3-2}, minGB13P2,P3)1. 
Similarly, C~~,B,l~(C~2,B~10Ca~,B~1~=C~~~~{~,~~~{~,~2+~~-~}+ 
al-l}, mi~{8,,min(P2,B3}}l. Since a,dl, E~,,BIIO(C~2,~21~ 
Ca,,B31)=Cma?cC0,ccl+cr,+cc,-2}, min(B,,b2,B3)1. 
(ii) Claim. If CM,, 8,l 1 CS,, y,l, and CQ, P23 2 C&, v21, then 
[a,, B,lC3[a2,B21~ [6,,y,lO Cd,, 14. From Definition 7, Cal, PIlO 
[a,, &I = Cmax{O, aI +a,- I}, miniPI, /L}l, and Cd,+ ~~1~3 C&, yJ= 
[max{O,6,+6,- l>, min{y,,y,}]. Therefore, given a,66,, q<~?~, 
yl<fil, and Y~<@~, it suffkes to prove that (a) max{O,a,+cr,-l}< 
max(0,6, +6?- l}, and (b) min(y,, y2) d {/I,, a,}. 
(a) Case 1. c(, +x2 d 1. Therefore, it follows that max{ 0, 6, + 6, - 11 
3O=max{O, a, +a2- 11. 
158 NG AND SUBRAHMANIAN 
Case 2. ~1, + c(~> 1. Since CI~ ~6, and a?< 6*, it follows that 
(6,+6,--l)>(c(,+c(,-l)>O. Therefore, max(0,6,+62-1}=(6,+6,-1) 
2 (ccl + 512 - 1) = max { 0, CI , + ~1~ - 1). This completes the proof for (a ). 
(b) It is true that min{y,, yz} dy, <or, and similarly minjy,, yz} d 
yZ 6 a,. Therefore, it follows that Mz{y,, y?) drninf~,, fi2). This com- 
pletes the proof for (b) and claim (ii). 
(iii) Claim. 0 @ [a,, j,] = 0. Th’ 1s result can be readily seen from 
the proof of Theorem 1, as the constraint for 0 is not satisfiable. 1 
Recall that p-programs allow non-atomic basic formulas to appear in the 
body but not in the head of p-clauses. As formalized in the following 
definition, a formula function determines assignments of probability ranges 
to non-atomic formulas by applying the operators 0 and 0 on the 
probability ranges assigned to atomic formulas. 
DEFINITION 8. Given an atomic function f: B, A V[O, 11, a corre- 
sponding formula function h: bf(B,) -+ %[O, 1) is defined inductively as 
follows: 
(i) h(F)=f(F), if F is an atom, 
(ii) h(F, A F,)=h(F,)@h(F,), where (F, A FZ) is in bf(B,), and 
(iii) h(F, v I;;)=h(F,)@h(F,), where (F, v F2) is in bf(B,). 
Thus, there is a correspondence between formula functions and atomic 
functions in the sense that given any formula function h, we can get an 
atomic function by restricting h to ground atoms. Likewise, given any 
atomic function f, Definition 8 allows us to obtain a formula function h. 
We now define an ordering on the set of formula functions. 
DEFINITION 9. Given two formula functions h, and h,, we say that 
h, <h, iff VFebf(BL), h,(F)zh,(F). 
DEFINITION 10. Let Z7.F denote the set of all formula functions. 
Note 1. Observe that arbitrary unions of closed intervals are not 
necessarily closed. To see this, suppose that our language consists of the 
single propositional symbol p, and that fj, for j > 1, assigns the closed inter- 
val [0, 1- liZi] to p. Then Uj,lfi(p) is equal to the right-open interval 
[0, 1). Thus, we cannot deftne greatest lower bounds by simply taking 
unions of closed sets. Instead, we take the topological closure (w.r.t. the 
order topology on the real line) of [0, l), which, as we expect, is the closed 
interval [0, 11. (Recall that in any topological space X, the closure, 
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closure(Y), of a set Yc X is the smallest closed set that contains Y. 
Closures are well defined in all topologies (Kelley, 1955)) 
The following lemma tells us that 99 forms a complete lattice. 
LEMMA 2. 99 forms a complete lattice M3.r.t. the ordering < defined 
above. 
ProoJ: For every subset G of F”9, VFE bf (BJ, u (G)(F) = 
n IP I&m=P and g E G} and n (G)(F) = closure( l,J {,u ) g(F) = ,U and 
s4). I 
The top element of 95 is the function h such that VFE 
bf(B,), h(F) = 0. The bottom element is the function h such that 
VFE bf(B,), h(F) = [0, 11. We now define a fixpoint operator T, for 
program P. 
DEFINITION 11. Let P be a p-program. T, : g;.F + 99 is defined 
inductively as follows: 
(i) For all atoms A EBB, T,(h)(A)= 0 M,, where M, = 
{p~A:ptF,:/~/\ ... A F,, : pn is a ground instance of a clause in P and 
Vi, 1 d i< n, h(F,) s p,}. If the set M, is empty, then TP(h)(A) = [0, 11. 
(ii) T,(h)(C, A Cz)= T,(h)(C,)@ T,(h)(C,), where (C, A C,) is in 
bf(B,), and 
(iii) T,(h)(D, v D,) = T,(h)(D,)@ T,(h)(L),), where (0, v Dz) is in 
bf(B,L 
In the following we prove that T, is monotonic. 
DEFINITION 12. Let F be a ground basic formula. Then let rank(F) be 
the number of distinct atoms occurring in F. 
THEOREM 2. T, is monotonic. (That is, whenever h, d h?, TP( h, ) d 
TAh, 1.1 
Proof. Given a basic formula F, proceed by induction on rank(F) and 
apply part 3 of Lemma 1. m 
DEFINITION 13. The upward iteration of T, is defined as follows: 
(i) T,fO = I; i.e., T,tO is the function that assigns [0, l] to all 
FE bf(B,) and 
(ii) T, T a = Tp( T, 7 (o! - l)), where u is a successor ordinal whose 
immediate predecessor is denoted by (n - 1) and 
(iii) T, 7 i, = u ( Tp t a 1 < A}, where 1 is a limit ordinal. 
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EXAMPLE 2. T, may not always be continuous. Let q : [0,0.5] t 
p : [0, 0] be the only clause of a probabilistic program P. Consider the 
following directed subset of F9: G = ( g,),FO, where g,(p) = [0, l/2’], 
g,(q) = [IO, 11. Then, (U G)(p) = [O, 01, and T,(Ll G)(q) = CO, 0.51. 
However, for all j, TP(g,)(q) = [0, 11. Therefore, it follows that 
Uj(TPfgj)(q))= CO, llZTp(Ll G)(q). 
To prove Lemma 4, we prove the following lemma first. 
LEMMA 3. For all F E bf(B,), T, 7 o(F) = p G- 3n < o such that 
Tp t n(F) = P. 
ProoJ: Proceed by induction on rank(F). 
Base Case: rank(F) = 1. Then FE A for some atom A. Suppose 
T,fo(A)#T,tn(A) for all n<w. Since T,t0(,4)~T,tl(A)~ ... 2 
TPf w(A), there exists an ascending sequence of integers ‘A~, c(r, . . . 
suchthat TPfa,(A)=,T,fcc,(A)~ . . . . In particular, since TPtco(A)= 
U (TPTn(A)I n<w), and TPfu(A)#Tpfn(A) for all n<o, the 
sequence aO, a,, . . . must be infinite. But for each aj in the sequence, 
T, t a,(A) = U Xi, where X, c & = (p / p is the annotation of the head of 
a clause which unifies with A j. Therefore, there exists a corresponding 
infinite sequence X0, X, , . . . of subsets of 1;9 such that A’, c X, c . . 
However, since program P consists of only a finite set of clauses. d and 
therefore the number of subsets of d must both be finite. Therefore, there 
exists i<j such that Xi= Xi, a contradiction! 
Inductive Case: rank(F) > 1. Then F is either a conjunction or a 
disjunction. 
Case 1. F=C, AC,. By Definition 11, T,to(F)=T,to(C, AC,) 
= T, t w(C,) @ T, t o(Cz). But by the induction hypothesis, there 
exist n,<o such that T,Tn,(C,)=T,lo(C,), and n2<o such that 
TPfn,(C,)=T,to(C,). Pick n=max{n,,n,}<o. Then it follows that 
TPTn(F)= TPtn(C,)OT,fn(C?)=T,to(C,)OT,tw(C,)= TPfw(F). 
Case 2. F-D, v D,. The proof is similar to the one for 
conjunctions in Case 1. This completes the induction and the proof of the 
lemma. 1 
Despite the fact that TP is not always continuous, the following result 
holds. 
LEMMA 4. There exists an integer n < w  such that T, 7 n = ifp( Tp). 
ProoJ Immediate consequence of the lemma above and the fact that 
bf(B,) is finite. m 
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Lemma 4 tells us that the Tp operator always achieves a lixpoint after 
a finite iteration. 
4. PROBABILISTIC MODEL THEORY 
In this section, we present a model theory that captures the uncertainty 
described in p-programs. We introduce notions such as probabilistic truth 
values of formulas and probabilistic interpretations and models for 
p-programs. We also study the relationships between formula functions and 
probabilistic interpretations, and between lixpoints of Tp and probabilistic 
models of P. 
DEFINITION 14. Consider any enumeration of 2BL, i.e., 2B’ = (K, , . . . . K,j 
for some integer r. A probabilistic kernel interpretation is a mapping KI: 
2BL + [0, I] such that for all Ki E 2BL, KI(K,) 3 0 and CK,EZBL KZ(K,) = 1. 
Hereafter, we denote KZ(K,) by kj. 
Intuitively, probabilistic kernel interpretations assume that the “real” 
world is definite, i.e., there is some set of propositions that are true, and 
some set of propositions that are false. However, it is not sure which of the 
various “possible worlds” (i.e., worlds are just 2-valued interpretations) is 
the right one. Hence, a kernel interpretation assigns a probability to each 
2-valued interpretation of our language. As 2EL consists of all possible 
worlds, the sum of all probabilities assigned must be 1. Any two distinct 
worlds are mutually incompatible as they must differ on at least one atom. 
Hence, we can compute the probability of a formula F in a kernel inter- 
pretation KI by just summing up the probabilities assigned to those worlds 
in 2BL in which F is true. 
Note on Notation. Throughout this paper, given a kernel interpretation 
KI, we use K, , . . . . K, to denote the elements of 2BL and k,, . . . . k, to denote 
KZ(K, ), . . . . KI(K,,) respectively. 
EXAMPLE 3. Suppose L consists of two propositional symbols p and q. 
Then KI(JzI)=O.4, KI({p))=O.25, KZ({q})=O.35, KZ({p,q})=O is a 
probabilistic kernel interpretation. Intuitively, Kf says that the probability 
that both p and q are false is 0.4, the probability that p is true in the real 
world but q is false is 0.25, the probability that q is true in the real world 
but p is false is 0.35, and the probability that both p and q are true in the 
real world is 0. 
Recall from the previous section that a formula function h specifies a 
probability range for each basic formula. Given h, we would like to find 
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those kernel interpretations whose probability assignments to basic 
formulas fall within the ranges specified by h. The notion defined below 
captures this idea. In the sequel, we will assume we are speaking about 
some fixed language L with 2BL = {K, , . . . . K, > and some fixed probabilistic 
kernel interpretation KZ such that KZ(K,) = kj for all 1 <j< r. 
DEFINITION 15. (1) Let h be a formula function, and let 99(h) 
denote the linear program 
( 
c kj <Pit 
) 
where h( Fi) = 
K,+F,and K,E~~L 
c k,= 1; 
K,t2% 
b’Kj E 2BL, k, >, 0. 
Let X9(h) be the solution set of the above linear program. 
(2) Let f be an atomic function. Then let 29(f) denote a linear 
program similar to the one above, except that there is one constraint based 
on the range assigned by f to each ground atom, instead of for each ground 
basic formula. Similarly, let XS(f) be the solution set of Y@(f). 
Note that in the above linear program, the K;s are 2-valued interpreta- 
tions and the Fls are basic formulas. All basic formulas are formulas of 
classical logic. Hence, the expression Kj k F is to be read: “K, satisfies F” 
where satisfaction is defined as in classical logic (Boolos and Jeffrey, 1980; 
Shoenlield, 1967). Note that every solution to Y’Y(h) is a kernel inter- 
pretation that satisfies h. Hence, we use the notation X9(h) to denote the 
family of kernel interpretations that satisfy h. 
Also note that each basic formula in our language generates an 
inequality in the above linear program. If function symbols are allowed in 
our language, then bf(B,) will be infinite and the linear program will have 
infinitely many constraints and kis. As far as we know, current technology 
on the theory of linear programming in infinite dimensional space 
(Anderson and Nash, 1987) can only deal with semi-infinite linear 
programs which have either infinitely many variables (k,‘s in our case) or 
infinitely many constraints, but not both. This is the technical reason that 
function symbols are disallowed in our framework. In the remainder of this 
section, we study the relationship between a kernel interpretation and a 
probabilistic interpretation, and more importantly the relationship between 
fixpoints and probabilistic models. While we discuss all these notions and 
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relationships in detail very shortly, we first examine when a family of kernel 
interpretations is non-empty. 
Consider the atomic function f associated, per Definition 8, with a given 
formula function h. As defined in Definition 8, for all A E B,, f(A ) = h(A ). 
In the following, we show that the family of kernel interpretations for a 
formula function h is the same as the family for the atomic function ,f 
associated with h; that is, X9(h) = Xx,/(f). The reason is that the 
constraints in 99(h) for non-atomic formulas are redundant and can 
therefore be discarded without altering the solution set to the linear 
program. These constraints are redundant because, as we recall from 
the previous section, probability ranges are propagated to non-atomic 
formulas through repeated applications of 0 and @ on the ranges assigned 
to atoms. Hence, in finding solutions to the entire set of constraints, it 
suffkes to consider constraints for the atoms only. In particular, Lemma 5 
below states that in the presence of the constraints for C,, C’, E conj(Z3,), 
the constraint for C, A C2 can be ignored. 
LEMMA 5. Let ~2 be a subset of 99(h) for some formula function h (i.e., 
a set of linear constraints defining a linear program). Further suppose that 52 
contains at least the following constraints: 
(i) R-a,<(C K, + c, and K, E 2~L k,) d PI (i.e., the constraint for h( C, ) 
for some C, E conj(B,)), 
(ii) S = c(~ < (C K, + c’z and K, E 2~L kj) 6 p2 (i.e., the constraint for h( C?) 
for some C, 15 conj(BL)), 
(iii) T=max{0,~,+~2-1}~(CK,~c,,c2..dK,.2BLkj)~min{~,,~2) 
(i.e., the constraint for h(C, A C,)), 
(iv) Z=ZK,+?BL kj= 1, and 
(v) M=QK,E~~~, k,aO. 
Then the solution set for (Q - {T}) is the same as that for Q. 
Proof: (i) Claim. The solution set for Q is contained in the solution 
set for (Q- (T)). For every solution k in the solution set for Q, it is 
obvious that k is also a solution to (52 - {T}). 
(ii) Claim. The solution set for (0 - {T)) is contained in the solution 
set for Q. Let k be a solution to (52 - { T) ). Let i, = (zK, + C, rr C2 and K, E2B, k,), 
4=(X K,+C,rx1CzandK,e2BL k.) i3=(C / 3 
CC 
K,C1C,/\CZandK,~228Lki), and b= 
K,+ ~c‘, A TCzand K,tZh , k-). Then constraints R, S, T and Z can be 
rewritten as: 
(i) R-cr,d(i,+i,)</I,, 
(ii) S=cr,<(i,+i,)djL, 
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(iii) T~max{0,a,+cc,-1}di,~min{~,,~,}, and 
(iv) I= cJ”= 1 ij= 1. 
Now let N be the constraint NE ij 2 0 for j= 1, . . . . 4. Note that whenever 
constraint h4 is satisfied, constraint N is satisfied. Since constraint ME Q, 
E is also a solution to (52 - { T} u {N} ). Now rewrite (Q - { T} u {N} ) E 
({R, S, Z, N}) u 52, for some set Qr of constraints. But recall that the set 
{R, S, Z, N} is th e same linear program used in Theorem 1. Then by 
Theorem 1, mine i, and maxQ i, are max{O, tl, +a,- l} and min{P,, /I,}, 
respectively; i.e., max{O, ~1~ + ~1~ - 1> d i, d min{ ,!?r , p2 >. In other words, 
every solution of {R, S, Z, N} satisfies constraint T automatically, and 
therefore every solution of {R, S, Z, N} is a solution of {R, S, Z, N, T}. 
Since k is a solution to (52 - {T} u {N}), L satisfies both Q, and 
{R, S, Z, N}. Th us, & satisfies both Sz, and {R, S, Z, N, T}. But Q2, u 
((R,S,Z,N,T))r(SZ-{T}u{N})u{T)~~u{N).Therefore,kisalso 
a solution to (Q u {N > ). However as argued above, since constraint h4 E Sz, 
it follows that the solution set for (Qu {N)) is the same as that for Q. 
Therefore, k is in the solution set for Q. This completes the proof of the 
lemma. 1 
A similar lemma exists for disjunctions; that is, given the constraints for 
D,, D, E disj(B,), the constraint for D, v D, can be discarded. The proof 
can be easily obtained by modifying the above proof to consider the 
redundant constraint T to be 
where ul, CI~, PI, and b2 are the lower bounds and upper bounds of the 
constraints for D, and D2, respectively. By repeated applications of the 
above lemmas, we show in the following theorem that all constraints for 
non-atomic formulas are redundant and can therefore be ignored in 
considering the family of kernel interpretations that satisfy a formula 
function. 
THEOREM 3. Given a formula function h, X9(h) = XS(f ), where f is 
the atomic function associated with h. 
Proof Consider the linear program 99(h). Pick any conjunction 
C1 A C2 E conj(BJ of the maximal rank. This is always possible as B, is 
finite (though there may be several different choices for picking C, A C,). 
Let the constraint for C, A C2 in 29(h) be T, the one for C1 be R, 
and the one for C2 be S. Since Yg(h) contains constraints Z and M as 
defined in Lemma 5, the lemma guarantees that the solution set for 
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(L.?P(h) - {T}) is the same as the one for 99(h), i.e., X9(h). Note that 
(6p?P(Zz) - { r}) still contains constraints Z and M. Thus among those 
conjunctions with rank > 2 and whose constraints have not been deleted, 
the lemma can be applied repeatedly to a conjunction of maximal rank. 
This iterative process stops when the remaining linear program only 
contains constraints for atoms, disjunctions, and constraints I and 
M-which is denoted by (99(h)-Q,) for some set Q, of constraints. 
However, each application of the lemma guarantees that the solution sets 
before and after a deletion are identical. Therefore, X9(h) is identical to 
the solution set of (P’P(h)-SZi). Now constraints for disjunctions with 
rank 2 2 are similarly deleted, based on repeated applications of the lemma 
for disjunctions. This iterative process stops when the remaining linear 
program only contains constraints for atoms and constraints Z and 
M-which becomes SPY(S)! However, each application of the lemma 
guarantees that the solution sets before and after a deletion are identical. 
Therefore, XY(f), the solution set of UP(f), is identical to the solution 
set of (99(h) - Sz,) which in turn is identical to X9(h). 1 
Theorem 3 demonstrates that from now on, we need to consider only 
linear programs associated with atomic functions rather than those 
associated with formula functions. 
EXAMPLE 4. Suppose B, = {A, B, C>. Then there are eight different 
Herbrand Interpretations Ki to K,, as summarized by the truth table 
below in the usual way: 
A B C 
K, 1 1 1 
K2 1 1 0 
Kj 1 0 1 
& 1 0 0 
KS 0 1 1 
K6 0 1 0 
K, 0 0 1 
KS 0 0 0 
Thus, K, represents the Herbrand Interpretation containing A, B, and C, 
and so on. Suppose for some formula function h, h(A)= [ml, fi,], 
h(B) = [a,, /I*], and h(C) = [a,, /Is]. Then since A is true in the classical 
2-valued sense in K, , K,, K, and K4, the constraint for A is 
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(As usual, ki denotes the probability assigned to the Herbrand interpreta- 
tion Ki.) Similarly, the constraints for B and C are as follows: 
a,dk,+k,+k,+k,<B,, 
a,<k,+k,+k,+k,</3,. 
For the given Herbrand Base B,, the set of all basic formulas bf(B,) = 
{A, B, C, A A B, A A C, B A C, A A B A C, A v B, A v C, B v C, 
A v B v C}. Then according to Definition 8, the ranges for conjunctions 
are computed using the operator 0. Hence, since A A B is true in K, and 
K,, the constraint for A A B is 
max{0,cc,+a,-1}~k,+k,~min{~,,~,}. 
Similarly, the constraints for A A C, B A C, and A A B A C are respectively 
max(0,cc,+a,-1}~k,+k,~min{~,,~~}, 
mux{O, cc,+ix,- 1) <k, +k,<min{j,, P,}, 
and 
max{O, Lx1 + a2 + cI3 - 2) dk, 6min{b,, Pz, P,}. 
As for disjunctions, again by Definition 8, the ranges are computed using 
the operator 0. It can be easily verified that the constraints for A v B, 
A v C, B v C and A v B v C are respectively: 
and 
mux{a,, az, tx3} <k, + ... +k,dmin(l,&+j?z+~3}. 
Now by applying the constraint deletion process described in the proof of 
Theorem 3, the constraint for A A B A C is deleted first, followed by the 
constraints for A A B, A A C, B A C, A v B v C, A v B, A v C, and 
B v C. What remains is the linear program 
cr,dk,+k,+k,+k,6B,, 
a,<k,+k,+k,+k,GBz, 
or,dk,+k3+k,+k,dP3, 
k,+ ... +k,=l, 
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and 
k 1, . . . . k, 2 0, 
which according to Theorem 3, has the same solution set as the original 
6p9”( h). 
In the following, we characterize those formula functions h (atomic 
functions) whose family xX4(h) of kernel interpretations is non-empty. 
DEFINITION 16. A formula function h is fully defined iff for all 
FE bf( BL), 125 c h(F) c [0, 11. An atomic function f is fully defined iff for 
all AEB~, @cf(A)E [O,l]. 
Intuitively, the assignment of the empty interval to an atom (or basic 
formula) tells us that there is no way of assigning a probability to that 
atom or formula. Thus, there seems to be an inconsistency concerning that 
atom or formula. This is what the definition of “full definedness” tries to 
capture. 
LEMMA 6. Let f be an atomic function, and h be the formula function 
associated with jY Then h is fully defined iff f is fully defined. 
Proof (i) Claim. If f is not fully defined, then h is not fully defined. 
There exists an atom A in B, such that the condition 0 c f(A) E [0, l] is 
violated. But since h(A)=f(A), it is not true that DC h(A)z [0, 11. It 
follows that h is not fully defined. 
(ii) Claim. If f is fully defined, then h is fully defined. Let F be any 
ground formula in bf (BL). Proceed by induction on rank(F). 
Base Case: rank(F) = 1. Then F is a ground atom. Since f is fully 
defined and for all FE B,, h(F) =f(F), it follows immediately that 
Qrch(F)s [0, 11. 
Inductioe Case: rank(F) > 1. Then F is either a conjunction or a 
disjunction. 
Case 1. FE C, A C,. From Definition 8, h(F) = h(C,)Q h(C2). 
From the induction hypothesis, (21 c h(C,) and Qr c (C,). Then it follows 
immediately from Lemma 1 that 0 = 0 0 0 c h(C,) 0 h(C,). This 
completes the proof for case 1. 
Case 2. F z D, v D,. The proof is similar to the one for conjunc- 
tions in case 1. This completes the induction and the proof of the 
lemma. 1 
We are now in a position to characterize formula functions whose 
families of kernel interpretations are non-empty. Theorem 4 tells us that if 
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a formula function h is fully defined, then the set dPP(h) of inequalities is 
guaranteed to possess at least one solution. 
THEOREM 4. If a formula function h is fully defined, then xX.9(h) is 
non-empty. 
Proof: From Lemma 6 above, and Theorem 3, it s&ices to prove that 
if f, the atomic function associated with h, is fully defined, then .Xx9(f) is 
non-empty. Without loss of generality, consider an arbitrary enumeration 
A r, . . . . A, of B, (where 1 B, 1 = n) such that f(Ai) = [cti, pi] for 1 < i< n, 
and such that c1r < CQ d . . . 6 ~1,. Based on this enumeration, the following 
table represents an enumeration of 2% 
/ A, A, ... A,, 
Kl 
K2 
1 1 0 
1 0 1 
. . . . 
i 0 0 
0 1 1 
. . 
i&-l 
&I+ 1 
. . 
K*n- I+*“-2 0 i 0 
K,,-I +2n-2+ 1 0 0 1 . . . . 
K,. 0 0 0 
For example, K, represents the 2-valued interpretation (i.e., world) 
{A r, . . . . A,}, K2 the 2-valued interpretation (A,, . . . . AndI}, and so forth. 
Under this enumeration, the system of linear inequalities 99”(f) defined in 
Definition 15 becomes 
u,<k,+k,+ ... +k2”-1<p1, 
u,<(k, + ... +kpz)+(kpI+,+ ... +k,n-,+2”-2)<j?2, 
cr,<k,+k,+ ... +k2n-,I/?,,, 
and 
2” 
c k,= 1. 
i=l 
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Then construct a solution for XY(f) by considering each inequality in 
turn: 
(i) Take the first inequality and set k, = cxl, k, = ... = kZn-l = 0. 
Then, k, + . . . + k,,-l= CL~, and therefore the first inequality is satisfied, as 
f is fully defined and M, d /II. In addition, k, , . . . . kznm I 3 0. 
(ii) Take the second inequality and set k7”+l+, = q - aI, 
k2”mlt2= ... =kznm,+2+ z = 0. Recall that c(r < c(? and hence k,.-I+ ,a 0. 
Then CiZ~-~kj+~jl-:.+::~Zki=k,+k,.-I+,=cc,+(2,-U,)=G(2. There- 
fore, the second inequality is satisfied as f is fully defined and CQ d /Il. In 
addition, k,, . . . . k,,- 1+~~-220, and k,+ ... +k2flmI+2.mz=a,. 
(iii) Continue this process one inequality at a time. Finally, when the 
last inequality is considered, set k,.- , = SI, - tl,,+ i. Then c,‘l-; k,-, = LX,, 
satisfying the last inequality as tl,, d p,. In addition, k,, . . . . k2”-, 3 0, and 
k,+ ... +kZ”p,=q2. 
(iv) Finally, to satisfy the condition that all kJs add up to 1, set 
k,. = 1 - ~1~2 0. Thus whenever f is fully defined, X$(f) is non-empty. 1 
Theorem 4 guarantees that the linear program generated by a fully 
defined formula function is always solvable. We show below an example to 
illustrate how the proof of Theorem 4 works. 
EXAMPLE 5. Continue with the situation described in Example 4. 
Without loss of generality, suppose the enumeration A, B, and C 
corresponds to the one where c(, 6 tx2 6 c/~. Then according to the construc- 
tion shown in the above proof, k, =c1], k,= k,=k,=O, k,=a,-a,, 
k, = 0, k, = CI~ - CQ, k, = 1 - c(~ is a solution to the linear program 
~11 <k, +kz+k,+k,<B,, 
cc,<k,+k,+k,+k,</L, 
q<k,+k3+ks+k,683, 
k,+ . ..+k.=l, 
and 
k , , . . . . k, > 0. 
DEFINITION 17. A probabilistic kernel interpretation KZ can be 
extended to a probabilistic interpretation which is a mapping Z from 
formulas to [0, l] in the following way: For all formulas F, Z(F) = 
CZ K,+FandK,~2~L~j). 
Theorem 4 is significant as it guarantees that fully defined functions can 
170 NGANDSUBRAHMANIAN 
always be extended to probabilistic interpretations that assign probabilistic 
truth values to formulas. The two lemmas below show that this way of 
assigning probabilistic truth values satisfies many general properties of 
probability. Hereafter whenever no confusion arises, we simply use I to 
denote a probabilistic interpretation, without referring to the probabilistic 
kernel interpretation KZ from which I is generated. 
LEMMA 7 (Hailperin). Suppose that KI is a probabilistic kernel inter- 
pretation and that I is the probabilistic interpretation associated with KI. 
Then the following conditions hold: 
(i) 1(4)=0, ry4-A A lA, for some A, 
(ii) I($)bZ($), ifd-ti, 
(iii) I( 14) = I -I(#), and 
(iv) Z(d v $)=Z(d)+Z($), [f$ A $=>A A lA,for some A. 
Fenstad (1980) has identified the following requirements for defining a 
probability function p on a first-order language L: 
0) ~(4 v \cI)+p(4 * I~/)=P(~)+P($), 
(ii) ~(14) = 1 -p(4), 
(iii) ~(4) =p(ll/), if 4 and II/ are logically equivalent in L, and 
(iv) p(4)= 1, if C$ is provable in L. 
It is obvious from the above lemma that probabilistic interpretations satisfy 
the last three requirements of Fenstad. The following lemma shows that 
probabilistic interpretations also satisfy the first requirement. The proof is 
straightforward. 
LEMMA 8. Let 4 and $ be arbitrary formulas in language L. Suppose that 
KI is a probabilistic kernel interpretation and that I is the probabilistic inter- 
pretation associated with KZ. Then I(4 v t,G) + I(4 A +) = Z(d) + I($). 
Recall that for every formula function h, there is a corresponding family 
of kernel interpretations X9(h). And as defined above, for each of these 
kernel interpretations, there is a corresponding probabilistic interpretation 
I. Therefore, associated with h is a family of probabilistic interpretations, 
denoted by f(h). 
DEFINITION 18. Suppose KI is a probabilistic kernel interpretation, and 
I is the probabilistic interpretation associated with KZ. Also let F be a basic 
formula and F,, . . . . F,, E bf(BJ, and P, po, -., ~1, E CO, 13. 
(i) Z+ F1 : p iff I(F,)E~, 
(ii) Z+(F,:p,r\ ... ~F,:p,)iffforalll<j<n,I+F,:p,, 
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(iii) Z~Z’O:~LotF, :p, A ... A F,,:u, iff Z/=FO:uO or Zk 
(F, : uI A ... A F, : uL,), 
(iv) Z+ (3x)(F: p) iff Zk (F(.x/t) : cl) for some ground term t, where 
F(x/t) denotes the replacement of all free occurrences of x in F by t, and 
(v) Zk (Vx)(P: ZI) iff Z+ (F(x/t) : ,u) for all ground terms 1. 
Note that Z k F: ,U defines a satisfaction relation, that is, a probabilistic 
interpretation Z either satisfies F: ZJ or not; Z does not try to calculate the 
probability range for F. As usual, we use the notation k also to denote 
logical consequence. We say program P logically entails formula F, denoted 
P /= F iff whenever Z is a probabilistic interpretation that satisfies each 
clause in P, then Zk F. We now investigate the relationship between 
tixpoints and probabilistic models of a p-program. Lemma 9 below is 
necessary to prove Theorem 5. 
LEMMA 9. Suppose h is a fully defined formula function. Then for 
all FE bf(B,), h(F) = [a, 81 is the smallest interval that contains 
{Z(F) 1 ZE Y(h)} which is the set of probabilistic truth values of F assigned 
by’ the family of probabilistic interpretations associated with h. 
Proof (i) Claim. For all F E bf (BL), h(F) = [cr, fi] contains 
{Z(F) 1 ICY(h)). Suppose there exists an ZEY(h) such that Z(F)+! [or, /3]. 
Then Z(F) does not satisfy the inequality a < (CK,+ pand K,(,E28L ki) = 
Z(F) 6 /I as defined in Definition 15. Therefore, Z cannot be in 4(h), which 
is a contradiction! 
(ii) Claim. For all FEbf(BL), if [S, y] contains {Z(F) I ZEY(h)}, then 
h(F) = [a, /I] z [S, y]. Let F be any ground formula in bf(B,). Proceed by 
induction on rank(F). 
Base Case: rank(F) = 1. Then F = A for some ground atom A. Con- 
sider some p E [cc, /?I. Recall that X9(h) = X4(f) which is the solution 
set for 2’S(f) as defined in Definition 15. Construct a new system Q’ from 
29(f) by only replacing the constraint c1 Q (CK,+ A and K,G2BL k,) d /3 with 
PG(C K, + A and K, E 2Br k,) <p. Recall from Lemma 6 that if h is fully defined, 
f is fully defined. Since @ c [p, ~1 c [0, 11, then by Theorem 4, Q’ has a 
non-empty solution set. That is, there exists a solution KZ for Q’. Since 
o! 6u 6 B, KZ~x.a(f) = X3(h). Therefore, if Z is the probabilistic 
interpretation corresponding to KZ, ZE Y(h). Thus, Z(F) = Z(A) = 
(C K, + A and K, E zBL kj) = p E [S, y]. This completes the proof that [a, /3] c 
[S, y] for the base case. 
Inductive Case: rank(F) > 1. Then, F is either a conjunction or a 
disjunction. 
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Case 1. F-C, A C?. By the induction hypothesis, h(C,) = 
[a,, fill and h(Cz)= [a,, /I*] are the smallest intervals that contain 
{Z(Cl) I ZEwdl and {Z(C?) 1 ZE 9(h) 3, respectively. Thus for all 
Z~4(h), Z satisfies the constraints of the linear program listed in 
Theorem 1, where Z(C,) = k, + kz, Z(C,)=k, +k, and Z(C, A C,)=k,. 
Then by Definition 8, h(C, A C,) = [a, 81 implies ct = mine Z(C, A C,) and 
p = maxQ Z(C, A CT!). Now suppose there exists [S, y] that contains 
{WI A Cd I ZEYa(h)) such that [S, y] c [cc, /I]. But according to the 
proof of Theorem 1, there actually exists I,, I, E.Y(ZZ) such that 
I, (C, A C?) = c1 and Z,( C, A C,) = /I. Therefore, [ 6, r] cannot contain both 
Z,(C, A C,) and Zz(C, A C,), which is a contradiction! Therefore, 
cc% Bl z IL4 Yl. 
Case 2. FED, v D,. The proof is similar to the one for conjunc- 
tion in case 1. This completes the induction and the proof of the lemma. i 
The lemma says that h(F) is the smallest interval that constains the set 
of all the probabilistic truth values of F assigned by the family of 
probabilistic interpretations associated with h. It is useful in proving the 
following theorem which states that all fully defined prehxpoints of T, 
generate a non-empty family of probabilistic models for P. 
THEOREM 5. Suppose a formula function h is fully defined. Then Y(h) is 
a famiIy of probabilistic models of P iff T,,(h) 6 h. 
Proof: (i) Claim. If h is fully defined, and Y(h) is a family of 
probabilistic models, then T,(h) d h. 
Let F be any ground formula in bf(B,). Proceed by induction on 
rank(F). 
Base Case: rank(F) = 1. Then F= A for some ground atom A. 
Consider the atomic function f associated with h. According to Theorem 3, 
XY( f) = X$(h). Therefore, ,a( f) is a family of probabilistic models. 
Recall from Definition 11 that for all A E B,, T,(h)(A) = n (p I A : p + 
F,:~,A ... A F, : p, is a ground instance of a clause in P and Vi, 1 < i < n, 
h(F,) c pi}. Let C be any clause described in the set above. Then, for all 
ZE S(f ), Z(A) E p, where p is the p-annotation in the head of C. Therefore, 
Z(A) E T,(h)(A 1. Thus, T,(h)(A 1 contains {Z(A) 1 ZEY(f)}. But by 
Lemma 9, f(A) is the smallest interval that contains (Z(A) 1 ZE S(f)}. 
Therefore, h(A)=f(A)s T,(h)(A). 
Inductive Case: rank(F) > 1. Then, F is either a conjunction or a 
disjunction. 
Case 1. F-C, A cz. By the induction hypothesis, h(C,) _C 
T,(h)(C,) and h(C,)G T,(h)(C,). But by Lemma 1, h(C, A C,)= 
h(C,)Oh(C,)c T,(h)(C,)O T,(h)(C,)= T,(h)(C, A C,). 
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Case 2. FE D, v D,. The proof is similar to the one for conjunc- 
tions in case 1. This completes the proof of (i). 
(ii) Claim. If h is fully defined, and T,(h) 6 h, then 9(h) is a family of 
probabilistic models. For all ZE Y(h), let A : p c F, : p, A ... A F,, : pFL, be 
a ground instance of a clause in P, and Z(F,) E pi, for all 1 < i 6 n. But by 
Lemma 9, h(l;,) is the smallest interval that contains {Z(F,) 1 ZE Y(h)). 
Therefore, Zz(Fi)s pi, for all 1 < i<n. Recall that T,(h)(A) = 
n{plklltF,:lllA ... A F, : p,, is a ground instance of a clause in P 
and Vi, 1 d ib n, h(F,) c pi>. Therefore, T,(h)(A) c p. Since T,(/z) < /z, 
h(A)& T,(h)(A)cp. However, since Z~.a(h), ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Z(A ) d /I, where h(A ) = [a, /i’]. Therefore, Z(A ) E p. Thus, Z + A : p +- 
F, : pL1 A ... A F,, : p,,. Combining the results of (i) and (ii), the theorem is 
proved. 1 
COROLLARY 1. Zf h is fully defined and h is a.fixpoint of T,, then X(h) 
is a family of probalistic models of P. 
LEMMA 10. Zf formula functions h, and hz are fully defined, then 
whenever h, <h,, it is necessary that XY(h,) 2 XY(h,). 
Proqf: Straightforward from Definition 9. 1 
COROLLARY 2. Suppose the least fixpoint of T, is fully defined. 
Then since T, is monotonic, it is the case that .Y(lfp(T,)) = 
U {#(f)l Tdf)Gf). 
According to the two corollaries above, if the least lixpoint of T, is fully 
defined, then it generates a non-empty family of probabilistic models for P. 
Moreover, this family contains the family associated with each pre-tixpoint 
of T,. As T, is a monotone operator on a complete lattice, it is guaranteed 
to possess at least one fixpoint (and hence there is at least one h such that 
T,(h) <h). However, it is possible that there is no formula function h that 
satisfies each of the conditions below: 
l T,(h)dh and 
l h is fully defined. 
For instance, let P be the p-program containing two clauses: 
q : [O, 0.21 + 
q : [0.4, OS] + 
Here, for all h E 8Y, T,(h)(q) = 0, and hence h d T,(h) for all h E 99. 
Thus, there is only one atomic function /I such that T,(h) d h, and this is 
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the function, denoted by h,, which assigns @ to q, i.e., h,(q) = @. Clearly, 
T,(h,) = h,. But h, is clearly not fully defined. For such a program P and 
such an h,, Y(h) = 0, In the following, we characterize p-programs whose 
least lixpoints are fully defined. 
DEFINITION 19. A p-program P is inconsistent iff it has no probabilistic 
model. 
We now relate probabilistic inconsistency with the notion of full 
definedness. 
LEMMA 11. Suppose I is a probabilistic model of the p-program P. Then 
for all FE bf ( BL), if T, 7 n(F) E p, it is necessary that I + F : ,u for all n 2 0. 
Proof: Prove by induction on n. 1 
The following theorem demonstrates that there is a close relationship 
between consistency of probabilistic logic programs and the full delinedness 
of the least fixpoint of the operator associated with the program. 
THEOREM 6. A p-program P is inconsistent iff Ifp(T,) is not fully 
defined, 
Prooj (i) Claim. If Ifp( TP) is fully defined, then P has a probabilistic 
model. 
By Theorem 4, XY(lfp(T,)) is non-empty. Then by Corollary 1, 
.Y(lfp( T,)) is a non-empty family of probabilistic models of P. 
(ii) Claim. If lfp(T,) is not fully defined, then P does not have a 
probabilistic model. 
By Lemma 6, if Ifp(T,) is not fully defined, then the atomic function 
associated with lfp(T,) is not fully defined. That is, RAE B, such that 
lfp( T,)(A) = $3. By Lemma 4, there exists an integer n 2 0 such that 
T,t (n + l)(A) = $3. Thus there exist clauses C,, . . . . C, so that for all 
l<idk, C,-A:p,tF;:p’,r\ ... AF’ :p’,and T,fn(Fj)Gpjforall 
1 <j < nz,. In addition flf=, pi = @. SupTose “i is a probabilistic model for 
P and hence C,, . . . . C,. If I k A : pi (i.e., Z(A) E pi) for all 1 Q id k, then 
Z(A) E OF= I pi= 0, which is impossible! Therefore, 3 such that Zl# A : pi. 
Since Z is a probabilistic model of P, Z p (Ff : CL; A . A FL, : pt,). Then, 
there exists a j, 1 <j,< mj, such that I l# Fi. : p;. However, by the above 
lemma, since T, 7 n(Fj) c_ pjLj, I /= Fj : ,u$ which is a contradiction! There- 
fore, P cannot have a probabilistic model. Combining (i) and (ii) the 
theorem is proved. 1 
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EXAMPLE 6. The following p-program is inconsistent, as rfp( T,)( p) = 
@ and rfp( T,)(q) = [O.l, 0.61: 
p : [0.3, OS] +- 
q : [O.l, 0.21 +-p : [0.2, 0.91 
q : [O.l, 0.61 cp : [0.3, 0.43. 
Example 6 demonstates another distinction between the paraconsistent 
programs of Blair and Subrahmanian (1987) and the framework proposed 
here. Blair and Subrahmanian would consider this program to use intervals 
as truth values. However, in the programs of Blair and Subrahmanian 
(1987, 1988), every program was guaranteed to possess a model. Moreover, 
inconsistent theories did not entail all formulas. However, in the 
probabilistic framework, programs need not possess models, and inconsis- 
tent theories entail all formulas. Thus, the system proposed here is not 
paraconsistent. 
Solvability of sets of linear equations has been widely studied (cf. Karwan 
et al., 1983; Lassez et al., 1989). In our work, linear programs are only used 
as a tool enabling the model-theoretic study of probabilistic logic program- 
ming. As such, we do not address deeper issues in linear programming in 
this paper. 
5. PROOF PROCEDURE 
In this section, we show how we may process queries to p-programs. 
DEFINITION 20. 8 is a unifier of annotated conjunctions C, = 
(A, A ... A A,):pLI and CZ-((B, A ... AB,):~~ iff (Ai l<i<n)= 
{ B,B 1 1 6 i 6 m}. Similarly, B is a unifier of annotated disjunctions D 1 = 
(A,v ... vA,):p, and D,=(B,v . ..vB.,,):pLZ iff {A;QIl<i<n)= 
{Bjf3 11 <i<m}. 
In the following we introduce a notion that is analogous to mgu’s in the 
classical paradigm. 
DEFINITION 21. Let UNZ(C,, C,) be the set of unifiers of C, and CZ. 
(i) Given 8,, e2 E UNZ(C', , C,), 8, < o2 iff there exists a substitution 
y such that 8, =8?y. 
(ii) 8, -8, iff e,<e, and t&<H’,. 
Intuitively 8, d e2 means that e2 is more general than 8,. Note that d 
may not be a partial ordering, since (?I < e2 and e2 d 8, does not 
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necessarily imply that 8, = Q2. It is, however, easy to see that 5 is an 
equivalence relation. 
DEFINITION 22. Given 8 E UNZ( C, , C,), denote the equivalence class of 
0 by [O]; i.e., [O] = {y 1 8 E y}. 
(i) [O,] < [O,] iff there exists y such that [O,] = [O,y]. 
(ii) CO,] < CO,] iff Cl?,] < Cd,] and CO,] # [O,]. 
DEFINITION 23. 0 is a max-gu (maximally general un$er) of C, and C2 
iff 
(i) 0 is a unifier, i.e., 0 E UNZ(C, , C?), and 
(ii) there does not exist 8, E UNZ(C,, C,) such that [O] < CO,]. 
We note here that max-gu’s3 are exactly like mgu’s in ordinary logic 
programming except that they are not necessarily unique. 
EXAMPLE 7. Consider the annotated disjunctions below: 
(AX, a) v p(Y, b)) : [L 11 
MZ Z) v AC, WI : Cl, 11. 
Then the following two substitutions are both max-gu’s of the above two 
annotated disjunctions: 
cl = {a/X, al-5 c/Y, b/W} 
oz = {c/X, a/W, b/Y, b/Z). 
The following lemma guarantees the existence of a max-gu, not 
necessarily unique, of two basic formulas, if they are unifiable. The proof 
depends on a result of Martelli and Montanari (1982) relating the unilica- 
tion problem to the solvability of a set of equations of terms. 
LEMMA 12. Zf two basic formulas are unifiable, then there exists a 
max-gu of the basic formulas. 
ProoJ: Here we only show the conjunction case, as the disjunction case 
is similar. In particular, we show that given C, = (A 1 A . . . A A,) : pL1 and 
C,=(B, A ... A B,) : pLz, if C, and Cz are unifiable, then there exists a 
max-gu of C, and C,. Informally, the proof proceeds as follows. If 8 is a 
’ Like the notion of a complete set of mgu’s, there is a corresponding notion for max-gu’s, 
which is unique up to the equivalence defined above. 
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unifier of C, and Cl, then for each A,, 16 i6n, there must be a B,,,,, 
1 <a(i) dm, such that Ait?= Bzci)O. Conversely, for each 1 6j6m, there 
exists a b(j), 1 < p(j) <n, such that Bjd = APlj,O. Thus, informally, when 0 
is applied to C, and Cz, there is a suitable “match” between the A;s and 
the E#ls. We may observe, informally, that C, and C, are unifiable iff there 
is a solvable set of equations of the form 
{n,=r,, . ..) n,=r,), 
where each /l;~ (A,, . . . . A,} and each r,~ {B,, . . . . B,) and {,4i 1 1 <i<r} 
= i A 1, . ..3 A,) and {r, 1 1 <j<m} = (B,, . . . . B,}. (Note here that we may 
have the same /i, occurring more than once on the left side of an equation, 
and likewise for the r’s, but the same equation cannot be repeated.) We 
now give a formal explication of this strategy. 
Formal Proof An atom A is of the form p(t, , . . . . t,) for some predicate 
symbol p and some integer n 2 0 such that for all 1 6 i6 n, t; is a term 
defined in the usual way. Call n the arity of A. Then let a, be the arity of 
Ai for 1 <id n and bj be the arity of Bj for 1 <j<m. Let A, be the kth 
argument of A, for 1 d k d ui, 1 < i 6 n and Bjk be the kth argument of Bi 
for 1 < k < b,, 1 <j < m. Set up all possible sets of equations such that each 
set of equations satisfies the following conditions: 
(1) The left side of each equation is some Alk, 1 d k < ai, 1 < i,< n. 
(2) The right side of each equation is some B,, 1 < k < b,, 1 <j < m. 
(3) For every equation A, = B,, for some i, k, j, I, the following 
conditions are true: 
(3.1) A, and Bj are atoms having the same predicate symbol, 
(3.2) k = I, and 
(3.3) for all 1 <h d ai= b,, there exists the equation A, = Bj,,. 
(In other words, whenever equations are set up between the arguments of 
two atoms, these atoms must have the same predicate symbol, and every 
argument of the predicate are equated in order.) 
(4) For all 1 <k < a,, 1 < i < n, there exists an equation with A, on 
the left side. 
(5) For all 1 <k < bj, 1 d j< m, there exists an equation with Bjk on 
the right side. 
(6) No equation is repeated. 
Intuitively, as the A,‘s and the Bjk’s are arguments of the atoms of the 
conjunctions, the equations defined above can be viewed as the constraints 
which the unification must satisfy. 
643/101/2-4 
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The proof of the lemma then consists of 4 parts. 
above(i) Claim. There are finitely many sets that satisfy the conditions 
Since all the equations are of the form A, = Bj, for some i, k, j, 1 such 
that 1 <i<n, 1 <j<m, 1 <<<a,, 1 <l<b,, there are at most nL*mL= 
nmL* distinct equations where L = max( {ui 1 1 < i 6 PZ} u { bi 1 1 <j 6 m) ). 
Thus there are at most 2nmLZ sets that satisfy the conditions above. Now let 
S,, . . . . S, be all such sets of equations which have solutions. The following 
shows that since C, and C, are unifiable, u b 1. 
(ii) Claim. Any unifier 8 of C, and C, is a solution to some set of 
equations defined above. 
Consider 8 = {u,/t,, . . . . u,/t,}, where ui)s are variables and ti’s are terms 
for some h. Rewrite each element of 8 in equation form; that is, either as 
ui = t, or ti = vi (1 < i 6 h) according to conditions 1 and 2. Consider those 
A,‘s (1<k6ai, l<i<n) and Bjk’s (1 <k<b,i, l<j<m) which do not 
appear in an equation. They are all ground terms. Since 8 is a unifier, each 
of these ground terms must be matched against itself during unification. 
Hence, for every A, (ldkba,, l<i<n) or B,k (1 <k<b,, 1 <j<m) 
which does not appear in an equation, add the equation Atk = A,, or 
Bjk = Bik. Thus the set of equations constructed in this way satisfies 
conditions 4 and 5. In addition, since 8 is a unifier such that 
{A,01 l<i<n}={Bje] l<j<m}, the equations constructed satisfy 
condition 3. Hence this set of equations is the same as Sj for some 1 < i < u. 
And obviously 8 is a solution of this set of equations. 
(iii) Claim. For all 1 < id U, a solution to Sj is a unifier. 
Given a solution, for every equation where either the left side or the right 
side is a variable, i.e., v = t or t = u, include u/t in 8. Now for any A,0 
(1 < id n), according to conditions 3 and 4, there exists some 1 <j< m 
such that Aid = Bje, as 0 represents a solution to the equations. Hence 
(Ai0 ( 1 didn} c (BjO 1 1 <j<m}. Similarly, for every B,e (1 <j<m), 
according to conditions 3 and 5, there exists some 1 < i< n such 
that A$= Bje. Hence {Ai0 1 1 <i<n} 2 {Bjt3 1 1 <j<mJ. Therefore, 
{Ait 1 1 <i<n} = {B,8 1 1 <jgm}. Thus 0 is a unifier. 
(iv) C&m. There exists a max-gu of C, and C,. 
Recall that S1, . . . . S, are the sets of equations that have solutions. From 
(ii) and (iii), it is proved that solutions to S,, . . . . S, correspond to all the 
unifiers of C, and Cz. Now for 1 < id U, as Sj is solvable, it follows by the 
result of Martelli and Montanari (1982) that each S, has an mgu Oi. 
Moreover, Bi is unique in the sense that if O, is also an mgu of Si, then 
8,-ai; i.e., [O,] = [ail. As we need to consider only finitely many such 
efs, it follows that {[e,], . . . . [IO,]) contain a maximal element (again not 
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necessarily unique) w.r.t. the d ordering. This maximal element is a 
max-gu of C, and Cl. 1 
The proof of the above lemma yields an algorithm to compute max-gu’s 
(or determine their non-existence). We believe that more efficient 
algorithms exist, but the study of such algorithms is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Once again, the main reason that we distinguish between 
max-gu’s and ordinary mgu’s is that the former are not always unique. In 
the remainder of this section, we present a proof procedure for p-programs. 
As this procedure operates on the compiled version of p-programs, we first 
formalize the compilation process. 
DEFINITION 24. Given a p-program P, define REDUN(P) = P u 
{A: [O, 1] + 1 AEB,‘i. 
DEFINITION 25. ( 1) Given a pair of distinct clauses C, , C, of the form 
C,=A,:p,cBody, and CZ E A, : pL? c Body, such that A,, A, are 
unifiable via max-gu 8, let the clause R,,, cZ be the clause A, 8 : (pL1 n pLz) t 
(Body, A Body,) 8. 
(2) The closure of a p-program P, denoted by CL(P), is the 
p-program constructed by repeatedly adding to P all the clauses R,,, cz 
obtained from distinct p-clauses C, and C, in P whose heads are unifiable. 
Note that in generating the closure of a p-program, unlike the treatment 
in Blair and Subrahmanian (1987, 1988), it is sufficient only to consider 
pairs of distinct clauses in P, instead of triplets, quadruplets, and so on. 
Suppose there is a clause R,,. . ‘;, that is generated from clauses C,, . . . . C, 
in the way defined above, where n 3 2. But observe that for n 2 2 and 
~,=[r,,/3~] for all l<i<n, p,n ... npL,=[a,,j,]n ... n[a,,/?J= 
[rna.~:, , c(,, mini=, /Ii] = pi0 n pj,, for some i,,,j, where 1 < i,, j, d n. Thus, 
the clause R,;O, c 10 can replace R,,, ,,,_ c,. 
DEFINITION 26. Given a p-program P whose clauses are all stan- 
dardized apart (cf. Lloyd, 1987), let m be the number of clauses in P. Then 
the normal form of P, denoted by NF(P). is defined as follows: 
(i) CF,(P) = DF,(P) = CL(REDUN(P)) 
(ii) for all 2<i<m, 
CF,(P)={(A, A ... A Ai):ptBody, A ... A Bo&IVl<j<i, 
Aj: ,uj+- Body,E CL(REDUN(P)), and p = p, @ . . . @,u,, 
andVldk,16i,k#I=z-A,#A,}, 
180 NGANDSUBRAHMANIAN 
DF,(P) = {(A, v . . . v Ai) : p 4- Body, A ... A Body, I Vl <j< i, 
Ai:pj+-Body,~cL(REDUN(P)),andp=p,@ ...GJp;, 
andVldk,l<i,k#l*A,#A,\ 
(iii) NF(P)=Uyt, (CF,(P)uDF;(P)) 
EXAMPLE 8. Let P= {B, : p,+Body,, B, : p2+-BodyZ, B, : p3+Body,}. 
Then: 
(1) REDUN(P)=Pu{B,:[O,l]+,Bz:[O,l]+}. 
(2) CL(REDUN(P))= REDUN(P) u { 
B, : (p-11 n/d+Bodyl * Bob, 
B, : (P, n CO, ll)+B&,, 
B, : bzn CO, ll)+Body,, 
B,:(P~~CO,W-B~~Y,} 
= REDUN(P)u {B, : (pL1 npLZ) c Body, A Body,). 
(3) CF,(P)= {(B, * 4): L-0, II+, 
(B, * Bd : (~10 P-4 1 I) + Body,, 
(B, * Bd : bLz@ [lo, II)+- B&z, 
(B, * BJ: ((p,ndO I3 ll)+Bo&, A Body2, 
(B, * Bd: (CO, ll@~,)+Body,, 
(B, * B,) : (P, 0~3) + Body, * Boalvj, 
(B, * 4) : (PL~OCL~) + Body, * Body,, 
(B, * 4) : (b, n d@d + Body, * Body2 * Bob). 
(4) DF,(P) can be obtained in a similar way. 
(5) Finally, DF,( P) = CF,( P) = @. 
We now show that the clauses added to P to construct NF(P) are logical 
consequences of P, and hence, they do not change the meaning of P. The 
addition of such clauses is to ensure that the truth value assigned to any 
basic formula depends on a single clause, rather than a group of such 
clauses. 
LEMMA 13. For every clause C E NF( P), P k C. 
ProoJ Case 1. CE P. Then if Z is a probabilistic model of P, Z must 
be a probabilistic model of C. Therefore, P k C. 
Case 2. CEREDUN(P)-P. Then C=A: [0, l]t for some AEBL. 
But for any probabilistic model Z of P, Z(A) E [0, 11. Thus Z k A : [0, 11. 
Therefore, P k C. 
Case 3. CE CL(REDUN(P)) - REDUN(P). Then C= A8 : (p, np2) 
c (Body, A Body,) 0. Recall from Definition 25 that the clause C is 
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derived from two clauses in REDUN( P), namely A, : p, t Body, 
and A, : p2 t Body,, such that A,, A, are unifiable via max-gu 0. (We 
assume that all clauses in CL(REDUN(P)) are standardized apart.) Let 
CO’ E A&?’ : (cl, n pZ) c (Body, A Body,) 08’ be a ground instance of C. 
Suppose I is a probabilistic model of P and therefore REDUN(P), as 
shown in case 2 above, and I k (Body, A Body*) 08’. Then I k Body, 00’ 
and I + Body, 90’. Since I is a probabilistic model of REDUN(P), 
I + AM : pL1 and IF AM : pr. Hence it follows that I+ A@ : (p, n p2). 
Thus, I + CO’, for any substitution 8’. Thus I + C. 
Case 4. CE Ui= z CF,( P), where I is the cardinality of P. Then for 
some 26k61, C=(A, A ... A A,):p+Boc$~, A . . . A Body, such that 
Vl <j<k, A,:p,+- Body,ECL(REDUN(P)), p=p,@ ... @pk, Vl <m, 
ndk, m#n*A,,#A,,. Let CO’=(A, A ... A A,)W:pt(Body,A ... A 
Body,) 0’ be a ground instance of C. Let I be a probabilistic model of P 
and therefore CL(REDUN(P)), as shown in cases 1, 2 and 3 above. 
Further suppose that I k (Body, A . A Body,) 9’. Then for all 1 <j< k, 
I + Bo&, 8’. But since I is a probabilistic model of P and CL(REDUN(P)), 
then for all 1 <j< k, I+ AjO’ : pj; i.e., I(A,O’)E~,. But according to 
Theorem 1, I(A, 8’ A A,O’) E ,u, @ pL?. By applying the same theorem 
repeatedly, I( (A, A . . A Ak) 19’) E 11, 0 ... 0 puk = p. Therefore, I k 
(A, A ... A A,) 8’ : p. That is, I k Cd’, for any substitution 8’. Thus, 
I+ c. 
Case 5. C E Uf= 2 DF,(P), where 1 is the cardinahty of P. The proof 
is similar to the one for conjunctions in Case 4. This completes the proof 
for the lemma. 1 
We now present a refutation procedure for query processing. 
DEFINITION 27. A query is a formula of the form 3(F, : p, A . . . A 
F,, : p,,) where for all 1 < i < n, F, is a basic formula, not necessarily ground. 
DEFINITION 28. Suppose C E G, : I., +- G, : I, A . . A G, : Am is a 
clause in NF( P) and Q = 3(F, : /J, A . . . A F,, : p,) is a query, and Q, C are 
standardized apart. Then 
3((F, :p, A ... A F,+, :pim, A G, :A, A ... A G,,,;l., 
AF,+I :/‘;+I A ... A t-,, :/i,,) 0) 
is an SLDp-resolvent of C and Q on F, : pi iff 
(i) 0 is a max-gu of G, and F,, and 
(ii) 2, G p,. 
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If 8 is a unifier, but not necessarily a max-gu, then the resolvent is called 
an unrestricted SLDp-resolvent. 
DEFINITION 29. An SLDp-deduction of the initial query Q, = 
3(Fl : PI * ... A F, : ,uL,) from a p-program P is a sequence 
<Ql, Cl, Q,>, . . . . <Qr, C,, Q,>, . . . . where for all i 2 1, C, is a renamed 
version of a clause in NF(P) and Qi+r is an SLDp-resolvent of Qj and Ci 
via a max-gu Bi. 
If the 0,‘s are not restricted to be max-gu’s, then the sequence is called 
an unrestricted SLDp-deduction. 
DEFINITION 30. An SLDp-refutation of the initial query Q, E 
3(F, : p, A ... A F,, : Pi) from a p-program P is a finite SLDp-deduction 
<Ql, C, > Q, >, . . . . (Q,, C,, O,,), where the SLDp-resolvent of Qn and C, 
via max-gu 0, is the empty query. 8 , . ..O. is called the computed answer 
substztution. If the Oi’s are not restricted to be max-gu’s, then the deduction 
is called an unrestricted SLDp-refutation. 
We now demonstrate that SLDp-refutation is always sound. Hereafter, 
given a query Q = 3(F, : p1 A ... A F, : p,,) and a substitution 8, we abuse 
the notation V(Q0) to denote V(F, : u, A . . A F,, : u,,) 8. 
THEOREM 7 (Soundness of SLDp-refutation). Zf there exists an SLDp- 
refutation of the initial query Q, z 3(F, : pl A ... A F” : p,,) from a 
p-program P, then P k V( Q, l3), where 8 is the computed answer substitution. 
Proof: Let the given SLDp-refutation be (Q,, C,, 8, ), . . . . (Q,, C,, 0,). 
Proceed by induction on n, the length of the refutation. 
BaseCase:n=l. ThenQ,-F,:~,andC,~G,:&t isarenamed 
version of a clause in iVF( P) such that F, O1 = Goti, and 2, c pi. Suppose 
I is a probabilistic model of P. Then by Lemma 13, Z is a probabilistic 
model of all clauses in NF(P). Therefore, Z k V(G, : A,). In particular, 
Z+ V((GO : &) 0,). That is, Zk V((G,O,) : iLo). Thus, Zl= V((GoO,) : p,) 
as &E,u~. That is, Z~V((F,O,):~,). Thus, Z+V((F, :p,)O,); i.e., 
It= VQ,Q,). 
Inductive Case: n > 1. Let Qi = (FI : p, A ... A F,,, : ,u,) and C, = 
G, : i, t Body, be a renamed version of a clause in NF(P) such that 
Fi8,=Go0, and &~~i. Now Q2=(F1 :u, A ... A F,_, :/A-, A Body, A 
Fi+, : pi+ I A . A F,,, : pL,) 8,. But by the induction hypothesis, 
Pl=V(QzO,...O,,). In other words, PkV((F, :pI A ... A F,-, :u,-] A 
Body, A Fit, :pi+, A . . . A F,:p,)tI,tI,...l?,). Therefore, PkV((F, : 
/AI A ... A Fj-1 :,u-l A Fi+, :p,+i A ... A F,:pL,)61,...0,), and Pk 
V((Body,) 8, . /3,). From the latter, it follows that P + V( (G,8, . .O,) : A,). 
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Therefore, as F,O, = GoOl, it follows that P k V( (F&I, . . .0,) : A,). Since 
&~ Pi, p I= vJ((Fie, . ..e.):~i)=V((F;:~i)e,...e,). Thus, Pi=V((F,: 
p1 A ... ~\~p,:/ip, A F,:u, A F,,, :u,+, A ... A F~:pL,)01...61n). 
Therefore, P + V(Q, 8, -8,)j.e. PkV(Q,fI). 1 
Before we proceed to prove the completeness of SLDp-refutation, we 
prove several lemmas below, all of which are used in proving Theorem 8 
(the Completeness Theorem). 
LEMMA 14 (Max-gu Lemma). Suppose query Q, has an unrestricted 
SLDp-refutation from P. Then Q, has an SLDp-refutation from P of the 
same length, such that tf el, . . . . 8, are the untfiers in the unrestricted refuta- 
tion, and t3’, . . . . 0: are the max-gu’s used in the SLDp-refutation, then 
8, -e,=e; . ..e.y for some y. 
Proof Similar to the proof for the classical case (Lloyd, 1987). 1 
LEMMA 15 (Lifting Lemma). Let Q, be a query and 8 be a substitution. 
Suppose Q,tI has an SLDp-refutation from P. Then QI has an SLDp-refuta- 
tion from P of the same length. Moreover, if 8,) ,.,, 8, are the max-gu’s used 
in the SLDp-refutation from Ql t3, and tI’, , . . . . 0: are the max-gu’s used in the 
SLDp-refutation from Q,, then 88, . . . 8, = 0; . . . &,y for some y. 
Proof Similar to the proof for the classical case (Lloyd, 1987). 1 
Lemma 16 below requires that P be a consistent p-program. 
LEMMA 16. (1) Let P be a consistent p-program, and C,, C, E 
conj(B,).SupposeP~(C,~C,):~.ThenP~C~:~,andPC=C,:~~for 
some p,, uL? such that p~~>~@p~. 
(2) Similarly, given D,, D, l disj(B~), if Pk (Dl v D2) : u, then 
P~D,:p,andP~DD,:uL?forsome,u,,u2suchthatu~p,@u2. 
Proof Since P is consistent, then for every probabilistic model I of P, 
Z(C, A C?) EP. Recall from Corollary 2 that the family of probabilistic 
models corresponding to the least fixpoint contains all probabilistic 
models for P. Hence, it follows from Lemma 9 that lfp(T,)(C, A C2)&p. 
But lfp(Tr)(C, A C2)=lfp(Tr)(CI)Qlfp(T,)(C2). Let u1 and u2 be 
lfp( T,)(C, ) and lfp( Tr)( C,), respectively. In other words, 11, @ c(~ E ~1. 
Again, by Lemma 9, for every probabilistic model I of P, Z( C,) E ~1~ and 
ZERO. Therefore, P k C, : pL1 and P b C, : p2, This completes the 
proof of ( 1). The proof of (2) is similar. 1 
LEMMA 17. Let P be a p-program, F be a basic formula (not necessaril-y 
ground), and ,u G [0, 11. Then P k 3( F : p ) * P k Fe : u for some ground 
instance F8 of F. 
184 NG AND SUBRAHMANIAN 
ProoJ: Proceed by induction on rank(F). 
Base Case: rank(F) = 1. Then F = A for some atom A. Let (A 1, . . . . A, ) 
be all the ground instances of A, and Ifp( T,) be denoted by h. Further 
suppose that for all 1 6 i< m, h(Ai) = [cci, pi]. Suppose there exists 
no i such that 1 6 i< m and [a,, pi] G n. That is, for all 1 ,< i<m, 
p 2 [cr,, pi]. In other words, for all 1 < i 6 m, there exists yi E [aj, pi] such 
that y, 4~. Now construct a linear program Q from 29(h) by replacing 
the m linear inequalities of the form zi 6 (CK,+ A,and K,E28L k,) < fl, with 
Y,G(C K, + A, and K, EZ~L k,) 6 yi, for 1 < i < m. Then by Theorem 4, the solu- 
tion set of Q is non-empty. That is, there exists a solution KZ for Q. Since 
c(~ 6 yi 6 pi, for all 1 < i 6 WZ, KZE X.$(h). (Recall from Definition 15 that 
X9(h) is the family of kernel interpretations corresponding to h.) There- 
fore, if J is the probabilistic interpretation constructed from XX, JE Y(h). 
Thus, J is a probabilistic model of P. But for all 1 < i < m, .Z(A,) = yi 4 p. 
Therefore, J t# 3(A : ,n), which is a contradiction! Therefore, there exists an 
i such that 16 i 6 m and [ai, /I,] c ,u. Now for any probabilistic model Z of 
P, Z+ Ai : [crj, bi]. Therefore, Zi= Ai : ,LL. Thus, it follows that P + Aj : p. 
Inductive Case: rank(F) > I. Then F is either a conjunction or a 
disjunction. 
Case 1. FE C A D. Let {F,, . . . . F,} be all the ground instances 
of F. For each 1 d id k, there exists a substitution Oi such that 
Fie Fe,= CO, A DO,. Let h be @(Tp). Then suppose it is not true that 
there exists i such that 1 <i< k and pi@llicp, where for all 1 <id k, 
h(COi) =pi and h(DQi) = j.;. In other words, for all 1 did k, pi@;lr g p. 
Let pi@,I,= [6;,6;] and (pi@Ai)np= [yf,r’], for all 1 <ibk. Then, by 
our assumption, [vi, r;] cannot contain both 6: and 6: at the same time, 
for all 1 < i 6 k. Now consider the following set of linear inequalities Q on 
any probabilistic model I: 
for all 1 d i 6 k, P{dZ(Cej)<p~, where pi= [pi, pr] 
for all 1 d i 6 k, 3.;dZ(D8,)63.;, where Evj = [%f, A:] 
for all 1 6 id k, S;<Z(CO, A DO,)<s;. 
Consider the new set of linear inequalities Q’ constructed from Q (that is, 
replace the ranges pi@Ai by (Pi@li)np, for all 1 <i<k): 
for all 1 d i < k, pf<z(aJ<py 
for all 1 d i d k, Af d Z(D8i) d 1: 
for all 1 < i < k, yf < Z(C8, A Dei) G y:‘. 
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But according to Lemma 9, all ranges computed by h are the tightest 
possible ranges. This is because, as shown in the proof of Lemma 9, 
probabilistic interpretations can always be constructed to take on the 
upper or lower bounds of ranges computed by h for all basic formulas. 
Then from the induction hypothesis, there exist probabilistic models that 
satisfy the following inequalities: 
forall 1 <i<k, pjd~(CB,,<p~ 
for all 1 6 id k, 2: d Z(D6;) 6 2; 
In particular, there are models that take on the upper and lower bounds 
of the inequalities. Thus according to Theorem 1, these models satisfy 
system Q above. However, since for all 1 < i 6 k, pi@ I., P p, either St or 6; 
does not lie in [yf, r;]. Th ere ore, f there exists a probabilistic model I such 
that it satisfies system Q above, but for all 1 6 id Xr, Z( CO, A DO,) does not 
lie in p. Thus, Z k 3(C A D) : ZL, which is a contradiction! Therefore, there 
exists an i such that 1 < i< li and pi@ jW, C_ p. Now for any probabilistic 
model I of P, I k (CO, A DOi) : (pi@ 1,). Therefore, It= (CO, A DOi) : p. 
Thus, it follows that P k (C A D)Oi : p. 
Case 2. FE C v D. The proof is similar to the one for 
conjunctions in case 1. This completes the induction and the proof of the 
lemma. 1 
LEMMA 18. Let P he a probabilistic program and Q- 
(F, : p, A ... A F,, : p,,). [f P + 3Q, then P /= QO ,for some ground instance 
QQ of Q. 
Prooj Let (Q,, . . . . Q,n3 be all the ground instances of Q. (Recall that 
our language is function free, and thus there are only finitely many such 
ground instances.) For each 1 <j<m, there exists a substitution 8, such 
that Q, E QtI, = F, 6j : pL1 A . A F,,ei : ,u~. Abbreviate Zfp( TP) by h. Let for 
all 1 <j < ~1, 1 < i ,< n, h(F&?,) = [pf,, p;]. Assume that there does not exist 
a tIk such that 1 <k <m and for all 1 6 idn, [pi,, p>, E.P,. In other 
words, for all 1 <j< m, there exists 1 6 id n, such that [pf,, p;] G pL,. Let 
for all 1 <j< m, 1 < i dn, [pf,, p;.] n pi= [II:,, r;]. Then by our assump- 
tion, for all 1 <j< m, there exists 1 <id )I, such that [yf,, ~51 cannot 
contain both pf, and pt. Recall that for any probabilistic model Z of P, I 
satisfies the following set Q of linear inequalities: 
. 
for all 1 d id n, PI, Gz(Fiem) d P:,. 
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Now consider the new set of linear inequalities Q’ constructed from Q 
(that is, replace the ranges [pi,, pz.1 with [pfi, p;] “pi= [ril. $1 for all 
1 <j<m, 1 <i<n): 
But according to Lemma 9, all ranges computed by h are the tightest 
possible ranges. This is because, as shown in the proof of Lemma 9, 
probabilistic models can always be constructed to take on the upper or 
lower bounds of ranges computed by h for all basic formulas. In particular, 
there exist models Z of P such that Z(F,0,) takes on the values either pfi or 
p;, for all 1 <j<m and some 1 < i<n dependent on j. Therefore, there 
exists a model Z of P such that Z(FiO,) $ pi for all 1 <j< m and some 
l<idn dependent on j. Thus, for all l<j<m, ZI~F,~,:~,A ... A 
F,6, : ,u,, which contradicts the assumption that P b 3Q! Therefore, there 
exists a Bk such that 1 d k < m and for all 1 d i6 n, [ph, pU,] E ,ui. Now 
recall that for any probabilistic model Z of P, Zk F,O, : [pf,, pk], for all 
1 <i< n. Thus, Zl= Fie, : pi, for all 1 < i< n. Therefore, it follows that 
Z k Qe, where Z is any probabilistic model of P. Thus, P k QOk. 1 
Lemmas 17 and 18 may seem false when one consider F; E disj(B,). 
Consider the classical logic sentence p(a) v p(h). This sentence may be 
represented as the single clause p-program P: 
(P(Q) v P(b)) : Cl, II+. 
Note that P does nor probabilistically entail the query (3x)(p(x) : [ 1, 11). 
To see this, let KZ be the probabilistic kernel interpretation that assigns i 
to each of the worlds K, = (p(a), p(b)}, K2 = {p(a)}, K, = {p(b)} and 0 to 
K4 = 0. Let Z be the probabilistic interpretation associated with KZ. 
Then Z is a probabilistic model of P, but Z assigns 3 to each of ~(a), p(b). 
Thus, Zk (3x)(p(.~) : [I, 11)). However, Z assigns 1 to (3x)p(x). This is 
probabilistically correct because, in general, the probabilistic statement 
P((3x) q(x)) = v is not equivalent to the (metalinguistic) statement 
WW(q(x)) = VI. 
LEMMA 19. Let P he a consistent p-program, F be a basic formula, and 
8 be a substitution. For CI > 1, if T, 7 cc(FB) c p, then there exists a clause C 
in NF( P) having an instance of the form G : ,u’ + F, : p, A . . A F,, : pn such 
that ,u’ E p and for all 1 < i < n, T, t (~1 - 1 )(F,) E p, and G subsumes F%. 
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Proof. Proceed by induction on rank(F). 
Base Case: rank(F) = 1. Then F- A for some atom A. Recall from 
Definition11 that TPfa(A)=r)S, where S=(pIA:p+F1:p,~ ... A 
F,, : pn is a ground instance of a clause in P and V’i, 1 d id n, Tp 7 (a - 1) 
(F,)G~;}. If S=@, then TPfa(A)= I = [0, I]. But recall that the clause 
A : [O, 1] + is in REDUN(P) and is therefore in NF(P). So this clause 
satisfies the requirement of the lemma. If there is only one element p in S, 
then the clause whose head annotation is fi is in P and therefore in NF(P). 
The lemma is therefore proved for this case. If however there is more than 
one p in S, then there exists a pair pi, ,u, E S such that pin pj = n S. But 
then by Definition 25, there exists a clause R,,, tz in CL(REDUN(P)) and 
therefore in NF(P) such that it is the closure of the two clauses Ci, C, 
whose head annotations are pi, p,, respectively, and whose head’s atomic 
parts have A as a common instance. And this clause satisfies the require- 
ment of the lemma. 
Inductive Case: rank(F) > 1. Then F is either a conjunction or a 
disjunction. 
Case 1. F=C, A C,. Then ,uz TPfa(F8)= T,fa(C,B)@T,t 
a(C,O) = p, @ pL2. By the induction hypothesis, there exists a clause in 
NF(P) having an instance of the form C; : II, +- F, : 1, A ... A F,, : II,, such 
that E,, z ,~i and for 1 6 i < n, T, f (a - 1 )( F,) E JUj and C’, subsumes C, 0. 
Similarly, there exists a clause in NF(P) having an instance of the form 
Ci:p,tG,:p, A ... “G,:p, such that pOzp2 and for l<i<m, 
TPf(a-l)(Gi)&p, and C’i subsumes C20. Then the clause C = 
(C,AC,)~:I,O~~CF,:;I,A ... AF,;,,:A,AG,:~~A a.. r\G,:p, is 
an instance of a clause in NF( P). Moreover, & 0 pO c p, 0 p? E p. Thus the 
clause C satisfies the requirement of the lemma. 
Case 2. F= D, v D,. The proof is similar to the one for 
conjunctions in case 1. This completes the induction and the proof of the 
lemma. 1 
We now demonstrate that SLDp-resolution is complete when we 
consider consistent p-programs. 
THEOREM 8 (Completeness of SLDp-refutation). Let P he a consistent 
p-program and Q he a query. Then if P k Q, there exists an SLDp-refutation 
of Q from P. 
Prooj: Let Q = 3(F, : p, A A F, : p,,). Then by Lemma 18, there is 
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FjB 3 
\ i’ 
q 
FIG. 1. Unrestricted refutation of F,O (base case). 
a 0 such that QO is ground and P + (QO). Therefore, for all 1 <j< m, 
P k (FiQ : ,uj), where F16’ is ground. 
Case 1. F,=A{ A ... A A:,. Then by Lemma 16, for all 1 d id nj, 
P t= (AjO : p,) for some pi such that p, @ .. . 0 p,,, G pi. Therefore, 
KNTPKA:Q~P,- Thus, there exists an integer a;‘<# such that 
T,~cc:(A~~O)c_pi. Now pick cx,=max{uII l<i<n,J. Since T, is 
monotonic, T, t a,(A/O) G p,, for all 1 6 i < II,. Since @ is monotonic, 
then for all 1 dj<m, TPfcli(FjB)= T,fa,(A{Q)@ . . . @Tptcti(Ai,8)E 
PI@ ... @p&pi. 
Case 2. F,=Ai v ... v Al,,. Then by Lemma 16, for all 1 6 i 6 n,, 
P + (A:0 : p,) for some p, 
Ifp(T,)(AjB)cp,. Thus, 
such that p, @ . @ p,,,,~ pi. Therefore, 
there exists an integer a,‘<~ such that 
TPfgf(AjO)Cp,. Now pick cti=ma?c[aij 1 <i<n,). Since T, is 
monotonic, TPtcti(A{O) up,, for all 1 6 i<n,. Since 0 is monotonic, 
then for all 1 dj<m, T,tcc,(F,B)= TPtaj(A{O)@ ... @T,fcri(Al;ie)~ 
PI 0 ... OP,9$. 
Therefore, by combining cases 1 and 2 above, it follows that for all basic 
formulas F, , . . . . F,,,, there exists an integer ai such that T, t M, (Fj‘ie) c p,!, for 
1 <j< m. Now pick CI = max (xi 1 1 <j< m}. Since T, is monotonic, 
T, t cr(F,,B) z pjii, for all 1 <j 6 m. Now we proceed by induction on rf to 
prove that there exists an SLDp-refutation of Fif3 for all 1 6 j d m. 
Base Case: z = 1. By Lemma 19, there exists a clause in NF(P) 
having a ground instance Cj = Fi8 : p; c , where p; G p,. Then Fig. 1 shows 
, G, A . . A Gk 
‘.. / 
I 
RI 
Gz A.. . A Gk 
R ‘.. / 
I 
RZ 
Ga A...AG~ 
\ 
=’ I 
Rs . . . Rk 
t 0 
FIG. 2. SLDp-refutation of G, : 1, A A G, : A,. 
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FIG. 3. Unrestricted refutation of F,O (inductive case). 
an unrestricted refutation of Fjtl. By the Max-gu Lemma, there exists an 
SLDp-refutation of Fj9. 
Inductive Case: c( > 1. Either (i) T, 7 (a - 1 )(F,O) z pi, in which case, 
by the induction hypothesis, there is an SLDp-refutation of FjO, or 
(ii) By Lemma 19, there exists a clause in NF(P) having a ground 
instance C,= F/O: &+- G, : A*, A ... A G, : 1,, such that ~;EP, and for all 
1 < i 6 k, TPf (CI - l)(G;) s ii. By the induction hypothesis, each Gi has an 
SLDp-refutation Rj. Therefore, the ground query Gi : I, A ... A G, : %, 
has an SLDp-refutation R, as shown in Fig. 2. Hence Fig. 3 shows an 
unrestricted refutation of F,O. By the Max-gu Lemma, F,tl has an SLDp- 
refutation. This completes the induction on c(. 
Thus for each 1 <j<m, there is an SLDp-refutation of F,d. And these 
refutations can be combined into an SLDp-refutation of Q0, analogous to 
the refutation shown in Fig. 2. Finally, by the Lifting Lemma, there is an 
SLDp-refutation of Q. 1 
6. EXAMPLES AND DISCUSSION 
We now present a few examples to show how SLDp-refutation works. 
EXAMPLE 9. Let P be the simple p-program containing the clauses 
p : [0.7, 0.71 + q : [0.3, 0.41 
q : [0.3, 0.31 t 
(1) 
(2) 
Consider now the query, Q, =p : [0.7,0.7]. A SLDp-refutation of this 
query is shown below: 
p : [0.7, 0.71 Initial Query (3) 
q : [0.3, 0.41 Resolving 3, 1 (4) 
0 Resolving 4, 2. (5) 
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Consider the more complex query Q2 = (p v p) : [0.7,0.8]. Clearly, 
P k Q2. And (p v p) : [0.7,0.8] can resolve with clause (1) in NF(P). Thus 
the remainder of the refutation proceeds in the same way as the refutation 
of Q,. 
In everyday reasoning, the occurrence of a single event E, may be the 
cause for some action. Likewise, event E, may be the cause for some other 
action. However, the simultaneous occurrence of events E, and E, may 
necessitate action that neither event, if occurring individually, would 
necessitate. For instance, a suspected murderer may be mildly alarmed 
when questioned by the police (event E,). He may hire an attorney (action 
A,). When he finds himself being followed by investigators (event E2), he 
becomes more alarmed and takes action (action AZ) to ditch his shadows. 
Having ditched his shadows, he hears on the radio that his father is being 
questioned by the police (event E,). He decides to flee to an obscure 
country (action A3). Clearly, event E, is routine and should not lead to 
action A,. Event E, by itself is also routine and should not necessitate A,. 
However, events E,, E,, and E, combined may be the cause for drastic 
action (e.g., if the father can invalidate the murderer’s alibi) and necessitate 
flight. Example 10 below presents another scenario. 
EXAMPLE 10. Viper Labs is a small medical laboratory. It has facilities 
to conduct three kinds of tests (called t,, t2, and t3) for identifying certain 
poisons secreted in the fangs of Indian vipers. There are three known 
species of vipers in India, and each secretes a different kind of poison 
(poisons ply p2, and p3). Viper poison acts rapidly on the human 
circulatory system, and if prompt action is not taken, a person bitten by a 
viper may die. Not much is known about the genera1 properties of such 
vipers as they are rather elusive creatures. However, based on statistical 
data derived from previous experience with these creatures (and their 
hapless victims!), it has been concluded that the figures shown in the table 
below hold: 
tl f? f3 PI PZ P3 
POS 
POS 
POS 
PO3 
neg 
neg 
neg 
neg 
POS POS 95% 50 % 75% 
POJ w 80% 35% 15% 
w POS 85% 25% - 
w w 20% - 15% 
POS POS 75% 100% 50% 
POS neg 40% 35% ~ 
w  POS 10% 25 % 50% 
neg w  
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The entries in the above table that are not filled in are to be treated as 
“don’t knows.” Intuitively, the first row in the above table says that if an 
individual X who has been bitten by an Indian viper tests positive on all 
three tests, then there is a 95% chance that he was bitten by a viper 
secreting poison p, . (We will assume that all the entries in the above table 
have a margin of error of f 5 %.) Thus, this really says that the probability 
that X is affected by poison p, lies in the 90100% range. 
The question is: Exactly how do we translate this table into a 
probabilistic logic program? We show two possibilities below. 
Possibility 1. We could translate the first row into the clauses 
p,(X): c0.9, 11-~,(Xpos): Cl, 11 A fz(X,pos): [l, 11 
A t,(X,pos) : EL 11 (1) 
p&Y) : [0.45,0.55] +- t,(X, pos) : [l, 1] A tz(X, pas) : [l, 1] 
A tx(X, pos) : [ 1, 1 ] (2) 
p3(X): [0.7,0.8] + t,(x,pos): [l, l] A tz(x,pos): [I, 11 
A t3(x, POS) : [ 1, 11. (3) 
Intuitively, the first clause says that if person X tests positive for t, , t,, and 
t,, then the probability that A’ is affected by poison p1 lies in the 90100% 
range. The second clause says that if person X tests positive for t,, t,, and 
t,, then the probability that X is affected by poison pz lies in the 45555 % 
range (and similarly for the third clause). Likewise, the second row in the 
table translates into the three clauses 
p,(X) : [0.75,0.85] c tl(X, pas) : [l, l] A tz(X,pos) : [l, l] 
A fx(x, W) : cl, 11 (4) 
p&f) : [0.3, 0.43 + tl(x,pOS) : [l, l] A &(X,pOS) : [I, 11 
A t3(x, neg) :‘[l, t ] (5) 
P~(X):[0.1,0.2]~t,(~,pOs):[1,1]Af2(~,POS):[1,1] 
A t3(X, neg) : [I, 11. (6) 
In the same way, we can translate the other rows in the table and thus 
obtain a p-program. Let us call this program P. Let us assume that p also 
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contains three facts about a person called jue, viz., that joe tested positive 
on all three tests: 
t,(joe,pos): [l, l] t (7) 
f2( joe, pm) : [l, l]t (8) 
tdjw ~0s) : [l, l]-. (9) 
Then it is verifiable that 
P b=Pl(joe 
and 
8) : [0.9, l] 
and 
P k p2( joe) : CO.45, 0.551 
P b p3( joe) : [0.7, 0.81. 
A proof of p,(joe) : [0.9, l] is shown below: 
pl(.W) : C0.9, 11 Initial Query (10) 
f,(x,pos): Cl, 11 
A f2(X,pOS): [l, l] A t3(X,pCks): [l, l] Resolving 10, 1 ( 11) 
t#,pos): [l, l] A t3(X,pos): [l, 11 Resolving 11, 7 (12) 
f&Kpos) : CL 11 Resolving 12,8 (13) 
0 Resolving 13,9 (14) 
Possibility 2. An alternative possibility is to translate the first row into 
the following three clauses: 
PI(X) : cO.9, 11 + (f,(x, /‘OS) A tz(X, P’S) A tdx, POS)) : cl, 11 (1) 
p*(x) : co.45 0.551 + (t,(x, POS) A f2(X, POS) A t,(X, POS)) : [ 1, I] (2) 
p&f) : [0.7, 0.81 + (tl(X,pos) A f2(X, ~0s) A t3(x, POS)) : [I, 11. (3) 
Here, the program clause bodies contain annotated conjunctions. 
Repeating this procedure for every row, we get a program Q which also 
contains the clause 
(t,(X,POs) A fs(X,POS) A t~(x,Pos)) : cl, 11 +. (4) 
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It is easy to ascertain that iVF(Q) contains the clause 
Pl(W ” P3(W : CO.95 11 
In addition, the following can be proved: 
Q I= Al : CO.93 11 
and 
Q k p,(joe) : CO.45 OSS] 
and 
Q k p,(joe) : (IO.7, 0.81. 
Suppose now that we wish to find suitable medication for Joe. We would 
like to find the most appropriate medication to give him. Suppose we have 
three medicines m, , m2, m3. We may have the rules 
giue(X, m,, [II) : Cl, 11 +-p,(X) : co.7, 11 
giue(J’, m2, PI) : CL 11 +p2(-U : CO6 11 
giue(Xm,, [ll): CL ll+p,(X): [Oh, 11 
gWX ml, CL 21) : CL 11 + (p,(X) vp2(X)) : CO6 11 
giue(X ln3, Cl, 31) : Cl, 11 + (p,(X) v p3(X)) : CO.8, 11 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
The first rule here says that if there is at least a 70% chance that X was 
bitten by a viper secreting pi, then we should surely give him medicine m,. 
The third argument of give just tells us which poisons are treated by this 
medication. On the other hand, the last rule is more complex; it says that 
if the probability of X being bitten by a viper secreting one of the poisons 
pi or p3 is greater than or equal to 80%, then we should give X medicine 
m3. Let VIPER be the program Q together with the above rules defining 
give. Then 
VIPER kgiue(joe, m,, [l]) : [l, l] 
VIPER k giue(joe, m2, [2]) : [0, l] 
VIPER k giue(joe, m3, [l, 31) : [l, l] 
VZI’ER F h(X) ” Pi : CO.92 11. 
M3/101/2-5 
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A proof of giue(joe, m3, [l, 31) : [l, l] is shown below: 
@Woe, m3, CL 31) : Cl, 11 Initial Query (11) 
(P~(W v P~V’)) : CO& 11 Resolving 11, 10 (12) 
(f,W, P) A f,(X F) A f,(X PO5)) : CL 11 Resolving 12, 5 (13) 
0 Resolving 13,4. (14) 
A doctor may wish to use medicine m3 to treat Joe as it treats both pi and 
p3. Of course, if Joe was bitten by a snake secreting venom p2, then he is 
going to die under this treatment. Such decisions are often made in critical 
situations, especially if medicine m2 is incompatible with medicine m3. 
We now present a few simple examples to demonstrate the specialization 
of the probabilistic framework developed here to the case of two valued 
logic. 
EXAMPLE 11 (Certain Information). Consider the following classical 
Horn program P’: 
Pv-) 4- 4@-) 
q(a) +. 
A corresponding p-program P is 
m3: CL ll+dW: Cl? 11 
q(a) : CL II+. 
It is easy to verify that ,fp( r,) = Tp r 2, which is the following formula 
function: 
Tp T W(a)) = CL 1 I, T, T 2(q(a)) = CL 1 I, 
Tt-T’Wa) A da))= CL 11, 
T,T2Ma) v da))= CL 11. 
Then 39(lfp(T,)) is the system of constraints 
1<(k,+k,)<l 
1<(k,+k,)<l 
lbki<l 
1<(k,+k,+k,)<l 
k, +k,+k,+k,= 1, 
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and 
where the four “possible worlds” are K, = (p(a), q(u)}, K, = {p(a)}, 
K, = {q(a)}, and K, = 0. But the only solution to LZP(lfp( Tp)) is k, = 1, 
kz = k, = k4 = 0, indicating that {p(a), q(a)) is the only “real world,” and 
that there is a unique probabilistic model for P’. Thus, in this case, the 
probabilistic semantics coincides with the classical logic semantics. 
The following result is easy to prove. 
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose P is any classical logic program (cf Lloyd, 
1987). Let Q be the p-program obtained by annotating all atoms in P with 
Cl, 11. Let I be any Herbrand interpretation in the sense of Lloyd (1987). 
Let pr(Z) be the atomic function that assigns [ 1, l] to all A E I and [0, 0] 
to all A $I. Then, for all ground atoms A, A E Tr(Z) i f f  T,(pr(Z))(A) = 
[ 1, 11. (The first occurrence of T, is the operator defined in Lloyd, 1987.) 
EXAMPLE 12. Consider the following classical Horn program P’: 
p(a) +- q(a). 
A corresponding p-program P is 
p(a) : CL 11+4(a) : CL 11. 
Then rfp( Tr) = T, 7 0 = I, indicating that nothing can be concluded. The 
behaviour is the same if q -p or q = (not p). 
EXAMPLE 13 (Inconsistent Information). Consider the following set P’ 
of clauses: 
P(U) + q(a) 
(not ~(a)) + q(a) 
4(a)- 
A corresponding p-program P is 
p(a): CL 11 +4(a) : Cl, 11 
P(U) : CO, 01 +4(a) : Cl, 11 
q(a) : Cl, 11. 
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Then Efp(T,)(p(a)) = @, indicating that program P is inconsistent. (It is 
easy to see that our notion of inconsistency generalizes the one used in the 
classical framework.) 
As we have noted earlier, the semantics presented here is not paraconsis- 
tent in nature; in particular, inconsistent p-programs entail everything. The 
least fixpoint of T,, however, may assign @ to some basic formulas, 
without assigning @ to all basic formulas. Hence, if we consider Ifp( Tp) as 
a “reasonable” way to interpret an inconsistent theory, then this semantics 
is paraconsistent. Whether one chooses to adopt this approach or not 
depends on the user. Consider the following example adapted from 
Bacchus (1988): 
EXAMPLE 14. Suppose we know that over 80% of all dogs bark, and 
that Fido and Benjy are dogs. However, Benjy is unable to bark (his vocal 
cords were injured at some point). This can be represented as 
bark(X) : [0.8, l] c dog(X) : [l, l] 
dog(fid0) : [ 1, 11 4- 
dog(benjy) : [ 1, 1 ] +- 
bark(benjy) : [0, 0] t . 
Here, I&( TP) assigns 0 to bark(benjy) and [0.8, l] to bark(fi:do). Thus, as 
far as Benjy is concerned, this database contains some inconsistency, but 
the existence of this inconsistency does not affect Fido. 
In general, our approach to representing probabilistic information is a 
subjectivistic view, while Bacchus’ (1988) approach uses an explicitly 
empirical representation of probabilities. However, as noted by Bacchus 
(1988, p. 19-20), “the possible worlds approach, which expresses a subjec- 
tive probability, can assign a probability to a closed formula, but is 
incapable of representing empirical probabilities.” On the other hand, 
Bacchus’ system “is incapable of representing a subjective probability 
assignment to a closed formula” (1988, p. 20). In addition, it is not clear 
how to use Bacchus’ system as a basis for logic programming. 
Note that the program in Example 14 can also be represented in 
the framework of Blair and Subrahmanian (1987) and Kifer and 
Subrahmanian (1992). According to their semantics, which is para- 
consistent, this program has a model. This program also shows that when 
intervals are considered to be truth values (as is possible in Blair and 
Subrahmanian, 1987; Kifer and Subrahmanian, 1991), the resulting 
semantics is different from the probabilistic semantics. 
The integration of logic and probability theory has been the subject 
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of numerous studies (Boole, 1854; Carnap, 1962; Hailperin, 1984; 
Lukasiewicz, 1970; Peirce, 1883; Dempster, 1968; Fagin and Halpern, 
1988; Nilsson, 1986; Shafer, 1976). Here, we only compare our work with 
that which has been directly related to our efforts. Nilsson (1986) has given 
an informal operational account for integrating probabilities into logic. His 
framework lacks a model theory. Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo (1989) in 
a pioneering paper, propose a model-theoretic basis for reasoning about 
systems of linear inequalities. Their aim is orthogonal to ours; they are con- 
cerned with satisfiability of such systems rather than with the assignment 
of probabilistic truth values to propositions. They explicitly state (Fagin et 
al., 1989, p. 2) that in their system “All formulas are either true or false. 
They do not have probabilistic truth values.” In this respect, our aims and 
techniques are different from those of Fagin et al. (1989). However, there 
seem to be a number of connections between our work and theirs; in 
particular, it would be interesting to see if their measure-theoretic approach 
could be used to develop a foundation for probabilistic logic programming, 
with inner measures serving as lower probability bounds, and outer 
measures serving as upper bounds for probabilities. We are currently 
studying this topic. In a related context, Kyburg (1974) has used a complex 
metalanguage that includes ZF set theory to express satistical information. 
Our proposal achieves similar goals within a first order framework. It is 
not clear how Kyburg’s proposal may be used as the basis for a program- 
ming language (it was not intended for that). 
The well-known Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (Dempster, 1968; 
Shafer, 1976) does not seem to fit into our framework in any immediate 
way. There is some controversy, at present, on the epistemological basis for 
Dempster-Shafer theory. For instance, Cheeseman (1985) argues that the 
theory of Dempster-Shafer belief functions is ad hoc and non-probabilistic 
(cf. also Shafer, 1976). However, recent results of Fagin et al. (1989) 
indicate a closer connection between Dempster-Shafer theory and 
probability theory. We avoid this controversy and note that a great deal 
of work still needs to be done in the development of a model-theoretic 
foundation for Dempster-Shafer theory. Fitting (1988b) observes that 
developing quantitative logic programming languages based on Dempster- 
Shafer theory is still an open problem. Bandler and Kohout (1984) suggest 
an interval valued representation of multivalued logical operations. Their 
framework is based on fuzzy set theory, and they compute the lower and 
upper bounds of an interval with the use of min-max and product-sum. 
Fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965, 1968) which also plays an important role in 
uncertain reasoning is well known to possess non-probabilistic features and 
hence we do not discuss it in greater detail here. 
In logic programming, most work on quantitative deduction has focused 
on non-probabilistic logic programming. We feel that one reason for this 
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has been because the relationship between logic and probability theory has 
been elusive. The frameworks of Blair and Subrahmanian (1988) have dealt 
with lattice-based logic programming. A similar comment applies to the 
work of Fitting who interprets conjunction and disjunction as GLB and 
LUB, respectively, in the lattice. However, probabilities do not respect this 
interpretation (e.g., the probability of a disjunction may be much greater 
than the LUB of the probabilities of the individual disjuncts). van Emden 
(1986) develops a quantitative logic programming language in which multi- 
plication is used to assign truth values to conjunctions. Of course, 
probabilities can be multiplied only if the events are independent, and 
hence van Emden’s framework is also non-probabilistic. Baldwin (1987) 
develops an operational model for evidential logic programming which is 
based on fuzzy set theory, and there is no immediately forthcoming model- 
theoretic basis for his work. 
Our framework has its limitations. In particular, there is no provision 
made for expressing conditional probabilities. In addition, we assume that 
programs are function free. This assumption was found to be necessary 
because we would like the set of inequalities determined by an atomic 
function to be finite. When function symbols are allowed, each ground 
atom (of which there may be an infinite number) determines an inequality, 
and hence we may have an infinite number of such inequalities. Solving an 
infinite set of inequations requires some different techniques. In a related 
context, Keisler (1985) has shown that even finite logics with a-additive 
probability distributions (cf. Halmos, 1950) over the domain of an 
interpretation are not compact. We are currently working on this problem. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Thus far, quantitative logic programming languages (van Emden, 1986; 
Fitting, 1988a, b; Blair and Subrahmanian, 1987; Subrahmanian, 1987, 
1990) have been unable to deal with probabilistic information. As 
probabilistic and statistical information is widely used in everyday 
decision-making, it is essential that logic programs have the ability to 
represent probabilistic information. We have proposed, in this paper, a 
probabilistic framework for logic programming. We have developed a 
probabilistic model theory and showed various connections between 
families of probabilistic models and the lixpoints of an operator associated 
with the program. Our probabilistic model theory satisfies the four proper- 
ties that Fenstad (1980) states as desiderata for a function to be considered 
probabilistic. In addition, we have developed a sound and complete proof 
procedure for such languages, To our knowledge, this is the first 
probabilistic semantics for quantitative logic programming. 
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In ongoing research, we are studying how this framework can be used to 
reason about queueing systems and for developing logic operating systems. 
The latter is greatly facilitated by the fact that mutual exclusion of events 
E,, E2 can be expressed as (E, A E2) : [0, 0] even though the individual 
probabilities of events E, and E, may be non-zero. We are also studying 
the support of variables in annotations and non-monotonic negation. 
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